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FOREWORD 
The North Central Regional Research Commit-
tee on Agricultural Price Policy (NCM-ll) has 
been conducting research on the impact of agri-
cultural price and income policies on agricultural 
producers, marketing agencies and consumers. 
To date the work has been organized and con-
ducted on the basis of commodities important in 
the North Central Region. This is the second 
regional publication dealing with the effects of 
the corn programs. The first publication was 
entitled "Effects of the USDA Corn Storage Pro-
gram on Corn Carryover Stocks and Utilization," 
published in January 1957 as North Central Reg-
ional Publication No. 77. 
It is intended that the present publication will 
add to our specific knowledge of the effects of the 
programs for corn and other feed grains on corn 
prices, feed grain production and livestock pro-
duction. Representatives of the Agricultural 
Experiment Stations in the North Central Region 
on the Agricultural Price Policy Committee are 
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SUMMARY 
EFFECTS ON UNITED STATES AVERAGE 
CORN PRICES 
What effect have the federal programs for corn 
and other grains had on corn prices? Three 
alternative hypotheses concerning the effects of 
the programs on corn prices are investigated in 
this study: 
(1) The Commodity Credit Corporation loans 
and storage operations pegged corn prices at the 
"effective" corn loan rates-that is, at the loan 
rates minus the cost of storage borne by farmers. 
(2) The eee loan operations and the with-
holding of eee owned stocks from the market 
had no effect on corn prices, since a bushel of 
corn is still a bushel of corn and exerts the same 
influence on price no matter who owns it. 
(3) The cee storage operations stabilized corn 
prices to an extent commensurate with the size 
of the storage stocks. 
Simple comparison of corn loan rates and prices 
each year since the eec program started in 1933 
shows that the first hypothesis must be rejected. 
In 1947, for example, the November-May United 
States average farm price of corn was 83 cents 
per bushel higher than the loan rate. The reason 
for this was clear enough; the stabilization stocks 
of corn carried over from the preceding year were 
too small to fill in the shortage caused by the 
small size of the 1947 crop. The next year, 1948, 
when the corn crop was large. the November-May 
average price was 24 cents below the loan rate. 
The same thing happened again in 1954; in 1955, 
the price was 37 cents below the loan rate. These 
differences between the loan rate and the price 
of corn are greater than the storage and other 
costs involved in the program. Evidently, the 
first of the three hypotheses is not confirmed by 
the facts; the loan program does not peg the 
price of corn closely at the effective loan rate. 
Statistical price analysis leads to rejection of 
the second hypothesis (that the eee operations 
have no effect on corn prices). It gives tenta-
tive support to the third (that the cee opera-
tions do support prices) but indicates that the 
extent of the support in recent years probably 
is somewhat less than if the stocks were con-
sumed and taken entirely out of the market. 
EFFECTS ON THE CORN PRICE SURFACE 
Each crop year from 1933 to 1940, the corn 
loans were made at a uniform or flat rate per 
bushel over the commercial corn area. Beginning 
with the 1941 crop year, geographical differ-
entials in the loan rates were introduced, based 
chiefly on moving averages of open market price 
differentials over recent periods of years. 
The flat loan rates before 1941 and differ-
ential loan rates after 1941 did not have much 
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effect on the unevenness and variability of the 
geographical corn price surface over the area 
(that is, on relative corn prices at different points 
over the area). The corn price surface, as rep-
resented by dollar-and-cent differentials between 
Nebraska and Iowa, and Ohio and Iowa, behaved 
much the same under the flat loan rates and under 
the differential loan rates as it did before the 
program began in 1933. 
When the geographical price differentials are 
deflated by division of the United States aver-
age price of corn each year, they show some 
tendency to be lower and more stable after 1941 
than before. It is difficult to determine how 
much of this can be attributed to the corn loan 
program, and how much to the existence of price 
ceilings during World War II, changes in freight 
rates, changes in relative livestock numbers and 
corn production, the increasing use of trucks and 
other factors. 
These findings have a bearing on the question 
of whether it would be desirable to replace the 
existing relatively stable geographical differ-
entials in loan rates by differentials which would 
vary each year inversely with the relative varia-
tions in corn production in different parts of the 
commercial corn area. This variation in loan 
rate differentials would conform more closely 
with the variation in price differentials that 
existed under the open market. The findings, 
however, show no rigidifying effect that can 
clearly be attributed to the flat loan rate or to 
the relatively stable differential rates rather than 
to other factors. There is no clear evidence that 
the present relatively stable differential rates 
need to be replaced by a system of differential 
rates that vary from year to year inversely with 
year-to-year variations in the size of the corn crop 
in different parts of the commercial corn area. 
EFFECTS ON CORN AND OTHER FEED GRAINS 
ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION 
The corn acreage allotment programs before 
World War II reduced corn acreage about 10 per-
cent but did not appreciably affect total feed 
grains production. Acreage allotment programs 
were put into effect again in 1954 and 1955; they 
did not appreciably affect corn acreage or pro-
duction, chiefly because compliance with the pro-
gram was low. The acres diverted from wheat 
and cotton under the wheat and cotton programs, 
however, and put into feed grains other than corn, 
increased total feed grains production about 10 
percent. 
The number of commercial corn counties has 
increased from 566 in 1938 to 932 in 1958. This 
inc l' e a s e has taken place mostly around the 
fringes of the Corn Belt and in the South. This 
appears to indicate that corn production has been 
moving out of the Corn Belt. 
The corn acreage and production data, how-
ever, show the opposite. They show that the 
acreage of corn in the 1958 commercial corn area 
has declined 8.5 percent in recent years below 
the 1948-50 level, but that the acreage of corn 
outside the area has declined further, 23.5 per-
cent below the 1948-50 level. They also show that 
corn production in the commercial corn area has 
risen 5 percent since 1948-50, but that outside 
the area, it has declined 7 percent. 
The data by states show that the acreage and 
production of corn is increasing in the four states, 
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, and decreasing 
in the southern states. 
Thus, corn acreage and production is not being 
driven out of the commercial corn area. On the 
contrary, it is moving into the commercial corn 
area. 
EFFECTS ON LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
Livestock production became more variable 
after 1933 when the corn loan program began 
than it was before. On the face of it, this could 
be regarded as evidence that the corn loan pro-
gram had an unstabilizing influence on livestock 
production rather than a stabilizing influence. 
Consideration of the main facts of the whole 
situation, however, leads to a different conclu-
sion. The corn loan program was a relatively 
small factor after 1933 compared with the other 
events that took place: the most severe drouths 
in history in 1934 and 1936, which reduced corn 
production 40 percent in those years; all-out pro-
duction of hogs as a war measure in 1943; price 
ceilings and rationing during World War II; a 
doubling of the price level after the war; a drop 
in total feed concentrate production of 25 per-
cent from 1946 to 1947 and a rise of 40 percent 
from 1947 to 1948; and war in Korea in 1950. 
These were the chief factors that caused the 
large variations in livestock production that took 
place after 1933. The controlling effect of feed 
supplies on pork production is shown by the cor-
relations of 0.87, between corn consumption Oc-
tober-September and pork production 3 months 
later, and of 0.94, between total concentrates fed 
and pork production over the period 1926-54. 
After 1947, on the average, the CCC corn loan 
program removed about 80 percent of the excess 
over average corn production in large crop years 
and returned it in small crop years. It thus had 
a substantial stabilizing effect on corn consump-
tion. The correlation between corn consumption 
and pork production during this period, however, 
when no very small corn crops occurred, was 
lower than for the longer period which included 
the short crops of 1934, 1936 and 1947. Appar-
ently, the cce program during 1948-56 could 
have had only a partial stabilizing effect on pork 
production. 
The effects of the CCC program on beef pro-
duction were too small to be measured with any 
accuracy. 

,Effects of the Federal Programs for Corn and 
Other Grains on Corn Prices, Feed Grains 
Production and Livestock Production· 
BY GEOFFREY SHEPHERD AND ALLEN RICHARDS 
This is the second report in a series dealing 
with the effects of the federal corn program on 
producers, processors and distributors, and con~ 
sumers. 
The first report showed the effects of the corn 
stabilization program on corn utilization and the 
size and location of corn stabilization stocks.1 
The present report covers a broader field. It 
analyzes the effects of the corn and other feed 
grains programs on the prices and production of 
these grains and livestock. 
EFFECTS OF CORN STORAGE OPERATIONS 
ON UNITED STATES AVERAGE 
CORN PRICES 
This section tests three alternative hypotheses: 
(1) The Commodity Credit Corporation (eCC) 
commodity loans and storage operations pegged 
corn prices at the "effective" corn loan rates-
the loan rates minus the cost of storage borne by 
farmers. 
, (2) The eec loan operations and the with-
holding of eec owned stocks from the market 
had no effect on corn prices, since a bushel of 
corn is still a bushel of corn and exerts the same 
influence on price no matter who owns it. 
(3) The cec storage operations stabilized 
corn prices to an extent commensurate with the 
size of the storage stocks. 
The corn stabilization program is implemented 
by corn storage and unstorage operations, backed 
up in some years by acreage control programs 
designed to reduce corn production when corn 
supplies become excessive. In conducting its 
storage operations, the ecc does not directly 
impound surplus corn (the excess over average 
production) in years of big crops. The ecc 
merely sets the rates in dollars and cents per 
bushel at which it will underwrite nonrecourse 
./Projeet NCM-ll, North Central Regional Research Committee On 
Agricultural Price Policy, Subproject No.3, Corn. 
1/Geoffrey Shepherd and Allen Richards. Effects of the USDA corn 
storage prograM on corn carryover stocks and corn. utilization. Iowa 
Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 446 (North Central Regional Publication No. 
77). 1957. 
loans to farmers and accepts any eligible corn 
which eligible farmers deliver in satisfaction of 
unredeemed loans. It then releases this corn for 
domestic use in later periods of small crops or 
increased demand when prices are above the pre-
vailing loan rate plus 5 percent and reasonable 
carrying charges, as currently provided by law. 
It can, however, sell for domestic use at any price 
corn which is going out of condition or threaten-
ing to go out of condition. There are no minimum 
price restrictions on sales for export. 
Whenever the stabilization stocks are insuf-
ficient to fill in the shortages, prices rise above 
the loan rates; sometimes they rise above the 
legal minimum CCC sales prices. Table 1 and 
fig. 1 show that the November-May average 
United States farm price of corn exceeded the 
loan rate in 1947, for example, as much as 83 
cents per bushel-well above the minimum sales 
price. 
The chart also shows that in several recent 
years the farm price of corn declined below the 
loan rate. The price declined as much as 24 cents 
below the loan rate in 1948 and 1954, and 37 
CORN PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS 
$ PER BU. 
2 
30Qr-+---
o 
u. $. orp,U1'MENf Of .C.II,CULfUItE 
1'1". _'-Gnu,.If, Ot'TOIU' 
NEe. ..... ,$.1171 ,I,(;'ItI!'UlfUII'AL •• "lCrt'Me URVIc:t: 
Fig. 1. United States average price of corn, loan rate (support price) 
and quantity of corn placed under price support 1933-56. 
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TABLE 1. CORN: U. S. LOAN RATES, U. S. AVERAGE FARM PRICES, AND DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THEM, SUPPORT PRICES 
AND QUANTITY PLACED UNDER SUPPORT, 1933-66. 
Average Placed under price support Under loan 
Year 
beginning 
October 
Announced 
national average 
loan rate* 
Average 
loan per 
busbel 
sealed 
Ave~age price 
prIce minus 
Average 
price 
minuB 
average 
loan rate 
--------------- or owned 
Percentage by CCC 
Nov.-Mayt announced 
loan rate 
Loans: Purcbase agreements Total of at end of production crop year 
(dollars 
per 
bushel) 
1933 ......... _ .. __ ... ___ ........ 0.46 
1934 ._ .... _._._ .. __ ._ ... _ 0.55 
1936 ............................. _...... 0.46 
1936 .................... _ .... _.......... 0.55 
1937 ._ ............. _ ... __ ....... _. 0.60 
1938 .. _. __ .. _._.............. 0.67 
1939 ._ .. _ ... _ ......... __ .... _. 0.57 
1940 ................ _._.............. 0.61 
1941 ............ _ ........ _ ..... _.. 0.75 
1942 ........................ _........... 0.83 
1943 ................................. _... 0.90 
1944 ......... __ .......... _........ 0.98 
1945 . __ .................. __ ..... _ 1.01 
1946 ._ .... __ .......... __ .. _.. 1.15 
1947 ._ .. ___ .... _ ............ _. 1.37 
1948 ............ _ ................... _.. 1.44 
1949 ._.................................. 1.40 
1950 ...................................... 1.47 
1951 ........ _ ........ __ ............ _. 1.57 
1952 .... _ .......................... _... 1.60 
1963 ._ ..... _ .......... _ .. ___ .... _ 1.60 
1954 ._ ..... _ .. _...................... 1.62 
1955 .................................. _.. 1.58 
19G6tt ................ _.............. 1.60 
1967tt ................................ 1.40 
(percent-
age of 
parity) 
60 
68 
55 
66 
58 
70 
69 
75 
85 
85 
86 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
90 
87 
84 
77 
(dollars 
per 
bushel) 
0.45 
0.55 
0.45 
0.55 
0.50 
0.67 
0.57 
0.61 
0.73 
0.77 
0.84 
0.89 
0.92 
1.08 
1.31 
1.39 
1.34 
1.40 
1.68 
1.56 
1.66 
1.68 
1.66 
1.42U 
(dollars 
per 
bushel) 
0.45 
0.83 
0.55 
1.06 
0.61 
0.44 
0.55 
0.58 
0.74 
0.90 
1.12 
1.07 
1.15 
1.38 
2.20 
1.20 
1.18 
1.65 
1.66 
1.47 
1.42 
1.38 
1.21 
1.21 
(dollars 
per 
bushel) 
0.00 
0.28 
0.11 
0.61 
0.01 
-0.13 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.01 
0.07 
0.22 
0.09 
0.14 
0.23 
0.83 
-'-0.24 
-0.22 
0.08 
0.09 
-0.13 
-0.18 
-0.24 
-0.37 
-0.29 
(dollars 
per 
bushel) 
0.00 
0.28 
0.11 
0.51 
0.02 
-0.13 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.01 
0.13 
0.28 
0.18 
0.23 
0.30 
0.89 
-0.19 
-0.16 
0.15 
0.08 
-0.09 
-0.14 
-0.20 
-0.84 
-0.21 
(million 
bushels) 
268 
20 
31 
·-61§ 
280 
302 
103 
111 
66 
8 
21 
3 
26 
1 
377 
332 
62 
25 
316 
377 
204 
361 
402 
(million 
bushels) 
····1 .. 
174 
66 
2 
1 
102 
94 
66 
60 
75 
(million (percent) bushels) 
268 11.2 
20 1.4 
31 1.3 
61§ 2.3 
230 9.0 
802 11.7 
103 4.2 
III 4.2 
56 1.8 
8 0.3 
21 0.7 
8 0.1 
26 0.8 
1 
551 16.3 
387 11.9 
64 1.8 
26 0.9 
417 12.7 
471 14.7 
259 8.5 
421 13.0 
477 13.8 
(million 
bushels) 
82 
45 
258 
471 
403 
197 
8 
6 
9 
9 
493 
660 
488 
306 
580 
736 
870 
1,060 
1,295 
°1 Applies to commercial area only in years when acreage allotments are In effect. 
t/Average price received by farmers In period when most of the corn is placed under price support. In recent years, loans have been available 
from time of harvest through May. 
;/Excludes purchase agreement corn placed under loan in the following year during the period 1948 to ·date. 
§/Included 14 m!llion bushels of 1937 corn placed under loan for first time in 1938 under short term loan program. 
"/Purchase agreements not available prior to 1947. 
tt/Loans were made to noncooperators at $1.26 per bushel in 1956 and at $1.10 in 1967~ 
U/lncludes corn placed under loan at $1.25 a8 well as at $1.60 per bushel. 
Compiled from reports of Commodity Stabilization Service. Data published currently in: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. The 
feed situation. 
Source of Table: U. S. Dept. Agr. Agricultural outlook charts, 1956. Nov. 1956. Table 35, p. 68; U. S. Dept. Agr. Grain and reed statistics 
through 1954. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 169. March 1955. Table 48, p. 46: U. S. Dept. Agr. Agricultural Marketing Serv-
ice. The feed situation. May 1956. p. 21, and later issues. 
cents below in 1955. Figure 2 shows that the 
prices of oats and barley behaved in a similar way. 
When prices decline substantially below the 
loan rates, large quantities of grain are put under 
loan or purchase agreements. This is shown in 
table 1 and fig. 1. In most recent years, from 
about one-fifth to about one-half of these loans 
or purchase agreements on corn were redeemed 
before the end of the marketing year; the remain-
der were taken over by the eee. 
OATS AND BARLEY PRICE TRENDS 
1.2511----+-, 
1.00 
1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 
vejjl 8I!'GINNIHIO JULY 
u. S. Of-PARTIII!NT 01' AGIilICULTuRe; NEG.l012_57Itl AGRII:uLTURAL "ARKETING SEIIr,C! 
Fig. 2. United States average farm prices of oats and barley, monthly, 
and CCC loan rates, annually, 1948-56. 
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These figures are based on United States aver-
age farm prices and loan rates. The individual 
situations in different parts of the country and 
in different months might differ considerably 
from the average. But fig. 3, based on Iowa 
average farm prices and loan rates, pinpoints 
3.501-
FARM PRICES I 
3.00 
UJ ~1. ~ ) ~~~/ 
II:: J ." 1JI I ~2.00 I q .. J -
UlUJ...J SOY~BEAN~S ~ I! \ ARM PRICE 
~2.50 
~ 
t j ~.!!-h"\~/-1'ir--+--= 
:J: 1.50 ' II r ~~ UI i I P-- _. " ....... . 
::;) (!- rr" , 
CD V F= i L ~i{"\ r'" LOAN RATE 
,1.00 ,··t ... _ .... J· ':L •• ;.."-r .... ..., 
.;f.... 
0.50P'"~ 
COiN 
O.OO~~~ .. ~~-=~~~~~~~~~-=~~~ OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. 
194041 42 43 44 4:1 46 47 48 49 :10 :II 52 53 
Fig. 3. Iowa average farm prices of corn and soybean., monthly, and 
Iowa CCC loan rates, annually, 1940-63. 
the situation in a smaller area and shows much 
the same situation as figs. 1 and 2. 
WHY Do CORN PRICES DECLINE BELOW 
THE LOAN RATES? 
It is easy to see why corn prices rise above the 
loan rates in short crop years when storage stocks 
are too small to fill out the shortage. Buy why 
do corn prices fall below the loan rate in years 
when crops and stocks are large, even though the 
CCC stands ready to make loans on all eligible 
corn offered at the loan rate and eventually take 
the corn over at that rate if the borrower wishes? 
The question can be broken down into three 
parts: 
1. Why does the actual United States average 
loan rate differ from the announced United Stutes 
average loun rate? The actual United states 
average loan per bushel sealed usually runs sev-
eral cents lower than the announced United States 
average loan rate. Table 1 shows that the two 
rates were the same during the flat loan rate 
period. During the period since 1940. however, 
when geographical differentials in loan rates 
were in effect, the actual rate ran several cents 
lower than the announced rate every year but 
1951 (when it was 1 cent higher). It feU as 
much as 9 cents below the announced rate in 1944 
and 1945. 
These differences between the announced loan 
rate and the actual loan rate result from several 
factors. , 
The institution of geographical and grade dif-
ferentials in loan rates in 1941 made it necessary 
(1) to devise a procedure for weighting the sched-
ule of county loan rates to assure that they would 
result in a United States average loan rate equal 
to the announced loan rate for all corn and (2) to 
develop a schedule of county base loan rates from 
which the premiums and discounts could be com-
puted in determining the amount to be loaned on 
each lot of corn placed under loan by each pro-
ducer. 
In devising a procedure for weighting the 
schedules of base county loan rates, the "normal" 
distribution of corn production was computed 
based on average corn production over the pre-
ceding 2 or 3 years. The resulting United States 
average of the base rate was weighted by the 
premiums and discounts on the basis of the esti-
mated historical quantity of corn subject to such 
premiums or on discounts based on inspected 
receipts. 
The base rate schedule of county loan rates was 
announced as applicable to corn grading No. 3 
with moisture content of 13.5 percent or less. 
For 1955, for example, the base county rates 
(prior to applying the 75-percent factor for the 
noncommercial area) for No.3 corn, 13.5 percent 
or under moisture, were weighted by the most 
recent county production data, and the resulting 
state averages were weighted by the 1950-54 
average production. This weighted average was 
$1.5947 per bushel. When adjusted for (a) prem-
iums and discounts (grade, mixed and moisture) 
and (b) for the grades of corn ineligible for loans, 
at historical market price differences, the United 
States average of the base county rates was $1.58 
per bushel, the approved United States average 
loan rate for all corn. For the noncommercial 
corn area, the base county rates were adjusted to 
75 percent of the rate used in weighting the 
schedules. 
These differences in the loan rate for geo-
graphical location and quality reduce the average 
amount loaned per bushel below the announced 
United States average loan rate. There are 
several possible reasons for this reduction: (1) 
The United States average announced loan rate 
is weighted by the historical average quantities 
of corn produced in each c 0 u n t y and state, 
whereas the United States average actual loan 
rate is weighted by the quantities of corn put 
under loan in each county and state. Relatively 
large quantities of corn are placed under loan in 
the counties and areas where the loan rate is 
below the United States average loan rate. (2) 
The premiums for corn grading better than No.3 
are not applied to the amount loaned if the corn 
is stored on the farm (such premium is applied 
only at the time of settlement on delivery of corn 
to CCC), while the discounts (moisture and 
mixed) are applied in all cases at the time the 
loan is made, for example, 2 cents per bushel on 
mixed corn. (3) The actual loan rate to producers 
in the noncommercial area is 25 percent (17.5 
percent in 1956) below those used to determine 
the United States average support rate. (4) There 
is a deduction for storage from the time of stor-
age until maturity date of loan on corn stored in 
approved warehouses. (5) In 1956 and 1957, still 
another factor existed. Considerable quantities 
of corn were stored under support in the com-
mercial corn area at the lower rate for producers 
who did not comply with acreage limitations. 
But this lower rate existed only in these 2 years. 
Examination shows that reasons 2, 3 and 4 
have only a small effect. Relatively small quanti-
ties of corn have been placed under loan in the 
noncommercial area, and the 75-percent factor 
was applied only in those years when allotments 
were in effect. Relatively small quantities are 
stored in warehouses (in 1955 less than 10 mil-
lion out of 361 million bushels) so the effect of 
the deductions for storage is relatively small. 
Further, the adjustment for moisture on ear corn 
stored on farms is not applied to the loan rate 
on ear corn stored on farms, as the quantity is 
determined by measurement and the adjustment 
for moisture is made by adjusting the bushels 
or the quantity placed under loan rather than by 
a reduction in the loan rate. Also, very little of 
the corn that is sealed grades "mixed." Thus, 
these three factors (items 2, 3 and 4) could not 
account for much of the difference between the 
amount loaned per bushel and the United States 
average support rate. 
This is shown empirically by the fact that on 
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TABLE 2. AVERAGES OF BASE COUNTY LOAN RATES AND 
ACTUAL LOAN RATES. 1955. 
Base county loan :rates per 
bushel for No. 3 corn-
13.5 percent moisture 
State 
Range-Com-
mercial 
county rates 
(dol./bu.) 
Iowa _____________ ._____________ 1.49 - 1.58 
Ohio ________ .___________________ 1.61 - 1.67 
Indiana ___ .___________________ 1.59 - 1.62 
Illinois _____ .. __________________ 1.58 - 1.64 
Missouri· _______ ._____________ 1.56 - 1.64 
Nebraska _________________ . 1.51 - 1.55 
Pennsylvania ________ . ____ _ 
Delaware _____________________ _ 
Estimated 
state average 
loan rate for 
all counties* 
(dol./bu.) 
1.528 
1.630 
1.602 
1.601 
1.604 
1.528 
1.750 
1.740 
Actual average 
loan per 
bushel 
(dol./b\i. ) 
1.520 
1.619 
1.601 
1.601 
1.597 
1.523 
1.740 
1.740 
'/Prior to applying the 75.percent factor in the counties outside the 
commercial area. 
a state basis the actual average loan per bushel 
is approximately equal to the estimated state 
average loan rates. Table 2 shows the data for 
a few states having a large number of commercial 
counties for 1955. 
This table clearly indicates that in 1955 the 
average amount loaned (the actual loan rate) in 
each state was close to the estimated average loan 
rate for that state. 
The difference between the United States aver-
age announced loan rate and the actual United 
States average loan rate, then, must be almost 
entirely due to item (l)-the fact that, beginning 
with 1941, relatively larger quantities were placed 
under loan in those counties and states where the 
loan rate is below the United States average sup-
port rate. 
Iowa is a state where all the county corn loan 
rates, basis No.3, are below the United States 
average loan rate. About 18.9 percent of the total 
United States corn production (based on 1955 
weighting of the loan rate schedule) is produced 
in Iowa, but 29.1 percent of the total United 
States quantity of corn was placed under loan in 
Iowa. In contrast, the county loan rates in Ohio 
(commercial area) are above the United States 
average loan rates; Ohio corn production aver-
ages 6.5 percent of the United States average, but 
only 4.3 percent of the United States total placed 
under loan was in Ohio. These differences in 
weiO'hting are the chief reasons why the United 
States actual average loan per bushel is lower 
than the United States announced average loan 
rate. 
The chief reason, therefore, the United States 
actual average loan rate (the average loan per 
bushel) usually runs lower than the United States 
announced average loan rate is simply a matter 
of statistical weighting. The actual loan rate is 
weighted by the quantities of corn put under loan 
in each county and state, whereas the announced 
rate is weighted by the historical quantities of 
corn produced in each county and state. The 
quantities of corn put under loan have been rela-
tively heavier than the quantities of corn pro-
duced in the states where the loan rate is below 
the United States average loan rate, and these 
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heavier weights pull the actual average loan rate 
down. 
2. Why is the efjective loan ?'ate lower t!z,an the 
actual loan rate? The fact that the actual average 
loan rate usually runs several cents lower than the 
announced loan rate, as shown earlier in table 1, 
is only one reason why corn prices in big crop 
years decline some distance below the announced 
loan rate. Table 1 showed that corn prices fall 
below the actual average loan rate too. Why is 
this? 
A farmer who is considering taking out a CCC 
loan on his corn is confronted by some money 
costs and some red tape. The service fee for taking 
out a loan is 1 cent per bushel on corn stored on 
the farm or 1;2 cent per bushel for corn stored in 
a warehouse. The fee for a purchase agreement 
is % cent per bushel. The interest rate on the 
loan is 3.5 percent; this, however, is not a net 
cost, because the farmer has the use of the money 
he borrows. . 
The farmer also incurs the costs of keeping the 
corn in storage. These costs are not all to be 
charged to the loan, unless the farmer otherwise 
would have sold all of his corn right after harvest; 
most farmers do not do this, because, in most 
years, the corn is too wet to sell until it has dried 
for several months on the ear in the crib. 
"The cost" of taking out a loan, therefore, is 
not a single simple figure. Even the cashexpe'nse 
differs from farm to farm, according to the type 
of storage structure, whether the farmer already 
has storage structures to hold the corn, or whether 
he would have to add to those he already has, 
whether he is a livestock farmer who would not 
incur the costs of shelling and delivery if he did 
not put his corn under loan, and so forth. The 
range of cash costs of storage estimated by 
different farmers in a recent survey is given in 
table 3. 
More farmers in this survey estimated the cash 
expenses for storing corn at 10-12 cents per 
bushel per year than at any other figure. Forty 
percent of the farmers sampled in Illinois esti-
mated their costs at this level, though the figure 
for the Iowa farmers was only 26 percent. This 
means that, in Iowa particularly, one cannot say 
what "the" storage expense was; the estimated 
expense is not a single figure, but a series of rates 
TABLE 3_ PERCENTAGE OF OPERATORS GIVING VARIOUS 
ESTIMATES OF CASH EXPENSES FOR STORING CORN IN IOWA 
AND ILLINOIS. 
Cash expense per 
bushel per year Iowa 
(cents) (percent) 
o ___________ ._. ______________ . _________________________ ""___________ 6 
1·3 _________ . _____ . ___________ . ______ .______________________________ 16 
4·6 __ . ________________ . __________________________ .______________ 18 
7·9 _________________________ . _____ . ___________ ._. ______ ._________ 16 
1 0·12 ________________________________ . __________________ .. _. 26 
13·15 ___ ... ____ . ___________________________ . __ .. __________ 10 
Over 15 _____ .... ______ .... _ .. ____________________ 8 
Total _________________ . _____ . ___ .. _________________ .____ 100 
Illinois 
(percent) 
1 
15 
14 
It! 
40 
10 
2 
100 
Source: Ernest J. Mosbaek. Participation in the corn support program. 
Unpublished M.S. thesis. Iowa State College Library. Ames. 
Iowa. 1955. 
for different farmers, ranging all the way from 
o to over 15 cents, with a wide dispersion about 
the average. . 
Accordingly, an average cost figure would not 
mean much. Perhaps the best way to summarize 
the information in table 3 is to say that most of 
!he fa.rm~rs (92. percent in Iowa, and 98 percent 
III ~llIllOlS) estImated their cash expenses for 
stO~Ill~ corn up to 15 cents per bushel, with the 
majOrIty up to about 10 cents. That is, the effec-
tive loan rate is considered to be about 10 cents 
per bushel lower than the actual loan rate for 
most farmers, and up to 15 cents lower for some. 
s. Why does the open market price decline be-
low the effective loan rate? Figure 1 showed that 
the United States average farm price of corn in 
big crop years declines as much as 34 cents per 
bushel below the actual loan rate. This is below 
the effective loan rate for most farmers. Why 
does this decline below the effective loan rate take 
place? 
qne reason the open market price of corn-the 
Umted States average farm price-declines below 
the effective loan rate might be that the open 
market price is an average of all the grades of 
corn that are being sold on the open market 
whereas the effective loan rate is the rate for No: 
3 corn, with a moisture content of 13.5 percent or 
less. If the average grade of the corn being sold 
on the open market were lower than No.3 this w~uld be one reason the open market av~rage 
prIce of corn would run below the effective loan 
rate. 
What are the facts of the matter? 
Analysis of the carlot inspections of corn in 
Chicago from 1940 to 1954 shows that the quanti-
ty of corn which grades No.4, No.5 and sample 
grades, is about 21 percent higher than the 
quantity that grades No.1 and No.2. That is the 
average grade of the corn received at Chicago-
which is a fairly representative sample of the 
corn produced in the commercial corn area-is 
substantially lower than No.3. This is one reason 
the average farm price for corn runs lower than 
the loan rate for No. 3 corn. 
Another reason corn prices decline· below the 
effective loan rate might be the small extent of 
participation in the support program by farmers. 
Table 1 showed earlier that on a national basis 
the highest percentage of a given year's cor~ 
production that was placed under support (both 
loans and purchase agreements) since the begin-
ning of the corn support program was 15.3 per-
cent in 1948. 
The story is much the same for Iowa, the major 
corn producing state. Table 4 shows the percent· 
ages of the Iowa corn crop put under loan in 
each of the years since 1950. The percentages 
range from 2 to 23.3. 2 
2/ There Is, however, considerable variation between counties in Iowa. 
One. county. Fremont. placed 40.9 percent of its production under loan 
in 1952 and 48.4 percent in 1953. In the same years another county 
Allamakee. placed 5.4 percent and 4.5 percent of its prodUction unde; 
loan. 
TABLE 4. PERCENTAGES OF THE IOWA CORN CROP PUT 
UNDER CCC LOAN, PERCENT OF IOWA FARMS COMPLYING 
WITH ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS AND PERCENT OF lOW A CORN 
ACRES ON FARMS COMPLYING WITH ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS 
BY YEARS. 1950.55. 
Years 
Percent of corn 
crop put under 
loan 
1950 ._ ....... _ ....... _.... 4.0 
1951 . ___ ._ ............ _.... 2.0 
1952 ......... ___ ...... _.. 20.0 
1953 .. _ ...... ____ ........ 22.0 
1954 .................... _.... 16.3 
1955 28.3 
Percent of corn 
farms complying 
with acreage 
allotments 
51.3 
44:4 
50.7 
Percent of corn 
acres on farms 
complying with 
acreage allotmen t 
54.5 
i8~6 
M.D 
These percentages could be low because only 
small percentages of farmers participated in the 
c~r~ acreage allotment program. A farmer is not 
ehgible to get a CCC loan if there is an acreage 
~ll?tment program and he is not participating 
mIt. 
This could not have been a reason in 1951, 1952 
and 1953, for corn acreage allotments were not in 
effect in those years; but what about 1950 and 
1954 and 1955, when corn acreage allotments were 
in effect? 
Table 4 shows the percentages of Iowa farms 
that participated in the acreage allotment pro-
grams in 1950, 1954 and 1955. The percentages 
of the total Iowa corn acres run about 10 percent 
higher than the percentages of Iowa farms. These 
percentages all run much higher than the percent-
ages of the corn crop put under loan. 
Does this mean that nonparticipation in the 
corn acreage allotment program is not a limiting 
factor on corn loans? 
It does not necessarily mean this. One would 
expect the percentage of the corn crop put under 
loan to be substantially smaller than the percent· 
ages of the corn acreage put under allotment be· 
cause most farmers who put their corn u~der 
loan do not put a high percentage of their total 
corn crop under loan. If they put only half their 
corn crop under loan, for example, that would 
mean that the loan percentages for the state 
would run only half as high as the acreage per· 
centages. 
The data, therefore, do not show directly 
whether nonparticipation in the corn acreage al-
lotment program is a limiting factor on the per~ 
c~ntage of the corn crop put under loan. Informa-
tlOn from another source, however indicates that 
nonparticipation is not an important factor. 
Table 5, taken from a survey of Iowa and north-
TABLE 6. IMPORTANT FACTORS CAUSING IOWA AND ILLINOIS 
FARMERS TO NOT SEAL CORN, 1952 AND 1953. 
Factors 
Iowa 
0/0 of opers tors 
who sold corn 
Corn did not grade No.3 or better 8 ~roduce~ did not have storage ......... ~::::::::::::::= 34 
xpe~te to feed corn ___ ................ ___ ............ 8 
AfraId govt. would not remOVe corn before 
N storage was needed next year ........... -_ ....... _. 13 ~ cash sooner than would get under loan. 1 
DD!fdferentblall. too. small ..... __ ........... _ ......... __ ....... 23 I not e leve m program . ___ .... _______ 8 
IllinoIs 
0/0 of operators 
who sold corn 
9 
29 
1 
6 
2 
24 
26 
Source: Ernest J. Mosbaek. Participation In the corn support program 
Unpublished M. S. thesis. Iowa State College Library Ames' 
Iowa. 1955. ' , 
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ern Illinois farmers in 1952 and 1953, shows the 
reasons that farmers gave for not sealing their 
corn. 
According to this table, the most important 
reasons in Iowa were lack of storage space and 
the small size of the differential between the 
market price and the loan rate. In addition, farm-
ers still remembered what happened in 1949, when 
many of them were "stuck" with corn sealed from 
the previous year, which the ctc was not able 
to take over by the time the 1949 crop began to 
be harvested. 
"Did not believe in program" was an im-
portant reason in Illinois; 26 percent of the Illi-
nois farmers listed that as a reason for not seal-
ing corn. But only 8 percent of the farmers in the 
Iowa sample listed that as a reason for not seal-
ing corn. The reason for this difference in beliefs 
is not known. 
Noncompliance may have become more im-
portant since 1953, because compliance has de-
clined substantially since that time. The figure 
for the commercial corn area as a whole in 1957 
was only 14 percent of total production.s 
"BEFORE" AND "AFTER" ANALYSIS OF CORN PRICES 
The preceding sections show the chief reasons 
the first hypothesis tested, that the CCC program 
pegged the price of corn at the effective loan rate, 
is not confirmed by the facts. The question then 
arises: How much stabilizing effect on corn prices 
did the program have? Did it have' no effect (the 
second hypothesis) ? Or did it have an effect com-
mensurate with the size of the stocks withheld 
from the market (the third hypothesis) ? 
A few years ago, Elmer Working made a study 
of the combined effects of the corn loan programs 
and the World War II price ceilings. 4 He com-
pared the coefficients of variation of the monthly 
prices of No. 3 yellow corn at Chicago for three 
5-year periods-1909-13, 1923-27 and 1928-32-
prior to corn loans and three 5-year periods-
1938-42, 1942-45 and 1948-52-since corn loans. 
The deflated pre-loan coefficients averaged 20.1; 
the post-loan coefficients averaged 13.2, only two-
thirds as large as the pre-loan coefficients. Work-
ing concluded then that "corn price controls-in-
cluding both the corn loan programs and the price 
ceilings of World War II-have substantially re-
duced the variability of corn prices."o 
This conclusion seems reasonable, and it ap-
pears to be based on a good statistical foundation. 
Working said, "At first I used the calendar years 
1937 to 1941 for one period, but this showed a 
larger coefficient of variation for· deflated corn 
prices than did any of the three pre-loan periods, 
due to the influence of the 1936 drouth on 1937 
corn prices. Consequently, I decided to use the 
8/ u. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. The feed situa· 
tion. Jan. 1968. p. 25. 
4/ Elmer Working. The effectiveness of free market prices in allocat-
ing resources within agriculture. Jour. Farm Econ. 35 :784·794. Dec. 
1953. 
5/ Ibid, pp. 788·89. 
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years 1938 to 1942 in spite of the overlap of one 
year with the 1942-45 period." 
Shifting this one period by 1 year, however, 
changes the conclusion materially. If Working had 
stayed with the original period, 1937-41, the table 
in his article shows that the coefficient of varia-
tion would have declined only from 20.1 in the 
"pre-loan" period to 19.1 in the "post-loan" period. 
He would have had to conclude then that the corn 
loan program brought about practically no reduc-
tion in corn price variability. 
The difficulty here is that from the "pre-loan" 
period to the "post-loan" period, several catastro-
phic events were taking place--the most severe 
drouth in United States crop history, two world 
wars, with inflations and deflations that doubled 
and halved prices, etc. These different events all 
exerted their effects on corn prices. One man 
might ascribe the resultant behavior of corn 
prices to one of these events; another man might 
ascribe it to another. Both would be wrong. When 
several diverse forces are at work, one cannot 
ascribe the net result of their influence to any 
one of them by simple before-and-after statistics. 
In the present case, there would be as much 
justification for calling the periods "pre-war" and 
"post-war" periods (or the "pre-inflation" and 
"post-inflation" periods) and then concluding that 
the war (or the inflation) had had this or that 
effect on corn prices. The mOl'e valid method is 
to compare prices after 1933, not with prices 
before 1933, but with what prices would have been 
without the loan program. This is attempted in 
the next section. 
MULTIPLE CORRELATION ANALYSES 
OF CORN PRICES 
The chief factors that determine the price of 
corn can be ascertained by means of multiple 
correlation analysis. After the effects of these 
factors are taken into account, any unexplained 
price residuals can be examined to see whether 
they can logically be attributed to the corn pro-
gram. 
R. J. Foote published an analysis of corn prices 
in 1953 0 and brought it up to date in 1957. His 
study included the three chief factors that ap-
peared to determine corn prices over the period 
1921-50, omitting the war years 1943-45: (1) the 
total supply of feed grains Oct. 1 each year (re-
flecting changes in supply); (2) the prices of 
livestock and livestock products (reflecting the 
total demand for all goods and services in the 
country, and also reflecting a part of the livestock 
demand for corn) ; and (3) the number of grain-
consuming animal units (reflecting the rest of the 
livestock demand for corn). In his study, these 
factors accounted for (explained) 95 percent of 
6/ R. J. Foote. Statistical analyses relating to the feed·livestock 
economy. U. S. Dept. Agr. Tech. Bul. 1070. June 1953. PP. 6, 10. 
See also: R. J. Foote, John W. Klein and Malcolm Clough. The de-
mand and price structure for corn and total teed concentrates. U. S. 
Dept. Agr. Tech. Bul. 1061. Oct. 1952. p. 38. 
the year-to-year variation in the price of corn. 
These factors are given in tabular form annual-
ly in table 6. The data have been brought up to 
date since 1950, the latest year included in Foote's 
original analysis. Charts of the data similar to 
those used in graphic multiple correlation analysis 
are shown in fig. 4. The lowest section of fig. 4 
shows the unexplained variations in the price of 
corn remaining after the influence of the factors 
shown above has been taken into account. 
The unexplained residuals (the variations that 
are not explained by the factors used in fig. 4) 
are given in table 7. They can be related to the 
storage operations of the eee. If a correlation is 
found, the next step would be to determine by 
logical economic principles whether the correla-
tion is only accidental, or whether the one can be 
considered the cause of the other. 
After the eee was set up in 1933, its Oct. 1 
stocks of corn grew to large proportions during 
two different periods-1938-41 and 1948-56. 
The lower part of fig. 4 indicates that the 1938-
41 operations had only a small effect on corn 
prices. But during 1951-56, corn prices rose to as 
much as 50 percent higher than their normal 
relationship to the factors shown. 
We have taken the differences between the ac-
tual price of corn and the estimated price each 
year during these two periods and plotted them 
TABLE 6. U. S. AVERAGE FARM PRICE OF CORN, NOVEMBER 
TO MAY, AND RELATED VARIABLES, 1921-56. 
Period 
begin-
ning 
Xo 
Price of 
corn 
Nov.-May 
(cents per 
bushel) 
1921 .. _________________ 51 
1922 .. _._ ...... ______ ._. 73 
1923 _................... 76 
1924 ____ ._ .............. 108 
1925 . __ . __________ ._... 69 
1926 ...... __ ... ___ .. 66 
1927 ...... _ ........ __ 83 
1928 ______ ._......... 83 
1929 ... _. ______ ._._. 78 
1930 ......... ________ ._. 60 
1931 _ ............ _.... 33 
1932 ' __ .,_ ... _ 24 
1933 ....... _. __ .... 45 
1934 ___ ............. __ 83 
1935 __________ ...... _. 56 
1936 ........ _________ 106 
1937 ._ ......... ____ .__ 51 
1938 ____ .... __ ... _. 44 
1939 ... _________ . __ .. 55 
1940 ......... _.________ 58 
1941 ........ _ .... __ .. _ 74 
1942 ______ ._._ .. 90 
1943 ..... _._ .. _____ ._ 112 
1944 .............. __ .. 107 
1945 ._ .................. 115 
1946 ________ ..... __ .. 138 
1947 . ___ .. _______ . ___ 220 
1948 ... __ ...... _______ 120 
1949 ...... _ ........ _ .. 118 
1950 ... __ ... __ ...... 155 
1951 __ . __ ... _ ....... _ 166 
1952 .. ________ . __ .... 147 
1963 _ ...... __ .. ______ 142 
1954 ........ ___ ._._ .. _. 138 
1955 .................. _ 121 
1956 _._ .............. 121 
• J Year beginning October. 
Supply of 
feed concen-
trates' 
(mil. tons) 
136 
126 
129 
114 
129 
123 
123 
126 
122 
113 
122 
138 
115 
82 
114 
90 
123 
130 
136 
140 
151 
172 
164 
158 
155 
157 
133 
167 
176 
179 
169 
167 
173 
182 
196 
200 
t J Index numbers, 1910-14=100. 
Grain-
consuming 
animal 
units fed 
annually' 
(millions) 
152 
163 
162 
151 
149 
152 
153 
153 
154 
152 
156 
159 
154 
131 
138 
138 
138 
148 
156 
156 
167 
192 
193 
173 
168 
160 
154 
160 
166 
172 
172 
159 
157 
162 
166 
163 
Price received 
by farmers 
for livesrock 
& products 
(Nov.-Maylt 
123 
132 
128 
144 
151 
150 
151 
160 
148 
110 
78 
67 
74 
106 
118 
123 
114 
108 
107 
122 
159 
194 
196 
206 
215 
278 
305 
285 
258 
329 
318 
278 
270 
240 
224 
237 
Source: R. J. Foote. Statistical analyses relating ro the feed-livestock 
economy. U. S. Dept. Agr. Tech. BuL 1070. June 1953. p. 
6. Data for recent years from Gordon King and H. Wein-
garten, AMS, USDA. 
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Fig. 4. United States average farm prices of corn, November-May, in 
relation ro (1) the supply of feed concentrates, (2) the number of grain 
consuming animal units fed and (3) the prices of livestock and live-
srock products. The lowest section of the chart shows the unexplained 
residuals. 
against the cee stocks of corn the next Oct. 17 
in fig. 5. The correlation is not very high, but it is 
positive, indicating that the withholding of the 
eee stocks had some supporting effect on corn 
prices. 
The slope of the regression line drawn freehand 
through the dots up to 1954 indicates that an 
increase in eee stocks withheld from the market 
of 300 million bushels, for example, raised the 
price of corn about 24 cents. Now 300 million 
bushels is about 10 percent of an average corn 
crop of 3 billion bushels, and 24 cents is about 16 
percent of an average price of $1.50. The elas-
ticity of the relationship between these two per-
centages is -0.625; this is about the same as the 
7 J Olle might expect a higher correlation with the srocks of corn on 
the preceding Oct. 1. But that correlation turns out to be lower than 
the one shown in fig. 5. 
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TABLE 7. ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED U. S. AVERAGE FARM 
PRICE OF CORN. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO, AND 
CCC STOCKS OF CORN. 1921-66. 
Price of corn per bushel Stocks of Corn Year under loan or 
beginning owned by CCC 
October Actual Computed' Difference on following Octobert 
(cents) (cents) (cents) (million bushels) 
1921 
------------------
51 64 3 
1922 
-----------------
73 77 -4 
1923 
-----------------
76 70 6 
1924 
---------.----------
108 91 17 
1925 
------------.--._ ... 
69 76 -7 
1926 
--------------------
66 85 -19 
1927 -------.--.-.-._-_. 83 87 -4 
1928 
------------------
83 89 -6 
1929 ---.~-------------- 78 86 -8 
1930 _____________ ._._n 60 65 -5 
1931 
------------------
33 36 -3 
1932 
---------.. _----- 23 25 -2 
1933 
---------------._--
45 37 8 81.6 
1934 
--------------------
83 84 -1 
1935 
--------------------
56 69 -3 0.4 
1936 
-----"._.---------- 106 97 9 
1937 
-------------_._----
51 49 2 45.2 
1938 
-------_. __ ._------- 44 47 -3 257.8 
1939 
------------------
55 46 9 471.1 
1940 ----------~----- 58 52 6 403.1 
1941 _____ ~n ________ 74 75 -1 196.6 
1942 ________ u ________ 90 97 
-7 8.3 
1943 
--------------------
112 108 4 6.0 
1944 
--------------------
107 104 3 9.3 
1945 
-------------------
115 108 7 0.1 
1946 
--------------------
138 137 1 9.1 
1947 
-------------------
220 199 21 0.2 
1948 
-------------------
120 127 -7 492.8 
1949 
--------------------
118 108 10 649.7 
1950 
--------------------
155 154 1 487.4 
1951 
-------------------
166 160 6 306.2 
1952 
----------------
147 124 27 580.0 
1953 _u_~ ____________ 142 107 35 736.0 
1954 ----------------~ 138 87 51 870.0 1955 
--------------------
121 72 49 1.060.0 
1956 
--------------------
121 73 48 1.295.0 
OJ Computed from an analysis based on logarithms for 1921-42 and 
1946-50, U. S. Dept. Agr. Tech. Bul. 1070. Data for 1952 to date are 
estimates as of November 1957. 
t / Data indicated for the year beginning October 1952, for example. 
refer to November 1952-May 1953 price of corn and the government 
stocks on Oct. I, 1953. 
elasticity of the demand for corn based on corn 
prices and corn production for the United States 
as a whole. 
In other words, the slope of the regression line 
50 w 
o 
(/) - -I 40 ::>O::w 
za..:c 
:2~~ 30 
wrlll 
up to 1954 indicates that the withholding of the 
CCC Oct. 1 stocks had about the same effect as if 
the stocks had been completely removed from the 
market, or never produced in the first place. The 
dots after 1954, however, lie below the regression 
line; this indicates that the ,dthholding of the 
stocks had less effect after 1954 than it had up 
to that time. 
Another investigation of the effects of the corn 
loan program was published by Gordon King of 
the AMS, USDA, 3 years after Foote's analysis 
was published. 8 One part of his study used the 
same variables as Foote used, but included only 
the years when CCC loans and stocks were small. 
This part of King's study yields results similar to 
Foote's results, when the price residuals are 
plotted against CCC stocks. The last two sen-
tences in King's report state: "Estimated prices 
are compared with actual prices to test the as-
sumption that quantities withheld from the 
market (stocks owned by CCC plus old-crop grain 
resealed) do not affect the November-May aver-
age price of corn received by farmers. Although 
no firm conclusion is reached, the results suggest 
that these stocks are usually isolated in such a 
way as not to affect the market price." 9 
The positive correlation shown in fig. 5 (and 
in a similar chart based on King's results), how-
ever, results almost entirely from the position of 
the dots for the years after 1950, which were not 
included in Foote's original multiple correlation 
analysis. (The years after 1951 were not in-
cluded in King's analysis.) The years after 1950 
and 1951, therefore, represent an extrapolation 
of the data beyond the periods in the analysis. 
8/ Gordon A. King. Some economic effects of supporting feed grain 
prices. Jour. Farm Econ. 38 :1415-1426. Dec. 1956. 
9/ King. op. cit., p. 1426. 
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It should be recognized that King's conclusion 
is valid only on the assumption that eee stocks 
are withheld from the market so as to have no 
effect on the supplies of feed grains, no effect on 
grain-consuming animal units fed, and no effect 
on the prices of livestock and livestock products. 
These are rather stringent assumptions. 
The conclusions indicated by Foote's and King's 
studies, therefore-that the withholding of the 
eee stocks effectively supports prices-need to 
be interpreted with some reservations. King 
expresses reservations of this sort concerning the 
results of his study. It is possible that the higher 
prices during recent years were partly due to 
structural changes in relationships. 
Analysis of post-1./,lar data. During most of the 
years included in Foote's analysis (1921-50, omit-
ting 1943-45) and all of the years included in 
King's analysis, eee loans and stocks were either 
small or nonexistent. This provided their anal-
yses with a good "eee-free" base from which to 
measure the effect of eee operations in years 
when they were large, but it has the disadvantage 
that structural changes in relationships may have 
taken place since the end of the periods included 
in the analyses. 
An analysis based on the years since World 
War II should be more free of this danger of 
structural change in relationships, although it 
may be subject to other weakness, such as the 
shortness of the series and the difficulty of sort-
ing out the effects of the eee during the period 
when it was operating on a large scale. An analy-
sis of this sort, based on the data given in table 8, 
is offered below. 
Figure 6 shows the total supply of corn each 
year since the end of the war, plotted against 
the November-May average farm price of corn. 
The dots for the years 1950-57, when eee stocks 
of corn were large, lie above and to the right of 
TABLE 8. FEED GRAIN AND CORN: PRICES RECEIVED BY 
FARMERS AND RELATED FACTORS, UNITED STATES, 1946-57. 
Feed grain supply Corn supply 
1946 
(mil. 
tons) 
1947 O.S 
mg iii:s 
1950 20.9 
1951 14.9 
1952 9.0 
1953 16.6 
1954 22.4 
1955 29.3 
1956 _ ..... ___ ... 34.7 
19571 ___ .___ 40.1 
(mil. 
tons) 
134.0 
108.0 
143.8 
161.2 
153.2 
143.0 
141.5 
146.7 
156.6 
170.8 
174.4 
192.3 
88 . 96 
(mil. 
bu.) 
135 105 9 
76 98 
75 89 493 
95 118 650 
102 109 487 
92 95 306 
87 92 580 
84 82 786 
78 77 870 
76 81 1.060 
68·· 89'· 1.296 
., Corn and sorghum grain Oct. I, oats and barley July 1. 
tl Under loan or owned by CCC. 
(mil. 
bu.) 
3,889 
2,639 
3,729 
4,051 
3,920 
3,666 
3,780 
3,980 
3,979 
4,266 
4,621 
4,823 
:'1 Index of prices received by farmers for feed grains and livestock 
and livestock products. 
§! Preliminary. 
"I November-December average. 
SOllrce: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Marketing Service. The feed 
situation. Jan. 1968. p. 23. 
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the dots before 1950 when eee stocks were small 
or zero. The residuals from these charts show very 
little relationship with livestock prices or produc-
tion. But when the eee stocks are subtracted 
from the total supply, the dots fall more closely 
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Fig. 8. November-May average index of feed grains prices received 
by farmers plotted against total teed grains supply, 1946-57. 
along on a single line, as shown in fig. 7. There 
is some tendency for most of the dots since 1954 
to fall below and to the left of the line. This 
would indicate that the eee stocks of corn had 
no depressing effect on corn prices until the last 
few years, when some depressing effect begins 
to appear. 
Figure 8 shows the relation between the total 
supply of the four feed grains and the index of 
prices received by farmers for the four feed 
grains. Figure 9 shows that when the eee stocks 
are subtracted from the total supply, the dots for 
the years when the eee stocks were large fall 
right along with the dots when the eee stocks 
were small. The correlation is -0.96. This would 
indicate that the eee stocks of feed grains as a 
whole had very little depressing effect on feed 
grain prices as a whole. 
In this case, however, the dots for 1949 and 
1953 are low, and the dot for 1957 is not low. 
This is different from the situation for corn, 
where the dots for 1949 and 1953 are not low 
but the dot for 1957 is low. 
The most recent conclusion on this subject pub-
lished by the USDA is: "When large quantities 
of corn and other feed grains are placed under 
price support and later delivered to eee, the 
Government becomes another outlet for corn and 
other feed grains. The effect on prices, however, 
is probably somewhat less than if the corn were 
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Fig. 9. November-May average index of feed grains prices received 
by farmers plotted against total teed grains supply less CCC stocks, 
1946-57. 
consumed and taken entirely out of the market. 
Corn moving into government storage is still on 
hand and is available for sale in domestic markets 
or for export at a future date."lo 
Our own over-all conclusion, based on the 
USDA studies and on our own analysis, is that in 
most years the withholding of the eee stocks of 
corn from the market had a substantial support-
ing effect on corn prices, but that the effect in 
recent years was not as great as if the corn had 
been consumed and removed entirely from the 
market. For feed grains as a whole, however, the 
effect of the withholding of the CCC stocks of 
feed grains appears to be as great as if the CCC 
stocks were removed entirely from the market. 
EFFECTS OF THE eec 
CORN LOAN PROGRAM ON 
THE CORN PRICE SURFACEll 
The purpose of this section is to determine the 
effects of the CCC corn price stabilization pro-
gram on the corn price surface over the Corn 
Belt; that is, on the prices of corn at different 
points over the area in relation to each other. 
Corn prices over the area are not uniform. The 
10/ u. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultursl Marketing Service. The feed sItua-
tion. Jan. 1958. p. 22. 
11/ The preliminary work 'n this section was done by Richard Day. 
corn price surface is not flat; it is uneven. Fur-
thermore, the relations among the prices of corn 
in the different parts of the area are not fixed. 
The corn price surface is not like the topography 
of an area of land, with hills and valleys in fixed 
locations, but rather like the surface of the ocean, 
swept by tides, swells, waves and ripples, and 
continually changing with the passage of time. 
TABLE 9. DECEMBER-MAY SIMPLE AVERAGE OHIO, NEB-
When the corn loan program was put into ef-
fect in 1933, the question was raised whether a 
flat loan rate, or a system of differential loan 
rates, should be adopted. The decision was reached 
to adopt the simple flat loan rate and see how it 
worked out. 
The flat loan rate was simple, but it did not 
conform with the uneven price surface that 
existed under the open market, which facilitated 
shipments of corn from surplus to deficit areas. 
Accordingly, beginning with 1941, the flat loan 
rate was replaced by a system of differential loan 
rates. 
The question then was, should the differentials 
be fixed, or should they vary from year to year in 
line with variation in relative corn production and 
perhaps also with yariations in relative numbers 
of livestock fed? 
The decision was made to adopt fixed differ-
entials. Originally, these differentials were based 
on 10-year and 3-year moving averages of prices 
by crop reporting districts and states. These dif-
ferentials, therefore, changed slightly from year 
to year as the moving average prices advanced 
another year; they did not, however, change 
drastically and inversely with each year's changes 
200 
160 
........ OHIO 
----IOWA 
--NEBRASKA 
1925 1930 
RASKA AND IOWA FARM PRICES 
MEANS DECEMBER 1909-MAY 1910.) 
Year Ohio Nebraska 
1909 
.-----_ ..... ------------- 60 51 
1910 M ______ • ___ ._. _______ 47 37 
1911 ._----------------_._. 66 61 
1912 
----.. ~------.-- 49 43 
1913 
---------------------
64 63 
1914 
---------_.-----------
71 62 
1915 .----.-----------.. _-- 67 55 
1916 --.-~------------- 114 100 
1917 • ______ •• n. ___ • _______ 140 133 
1918 
---------_ ... _-----. 148 138 
1919 
------------------
149 134 
1920 ------~------------- 61 38 1921 
-----.. ---------._----
53 36 
1922 
-----------------------
76 62 
1923 ----------~---------- 74 58 1924 .-~-----------~ 118 100 
1925 -------~----------~- 62 58 1926 
-----------------
62 68 
1927 ----~-----. 91 74 
1928 ._--------_._--- 89 75 
1929 75 64 
1930 ::=:==::::::::::: 67 44 
1931 
--------_.-.. ---------- 29 31 
1932 
---------------
27 17 
1933 -----------~~- 44 34 1934 ------------.---~ 80 94 
1935 
----------------
49 62 
1936 
---------------_.------
103 120 
1937 ... u ____________ ~ 51 52 
1938 ----.-.~-------.------- 46 38 
1939 
-------------------
66 56 
1940 ._. _____ • _____ u ____ 65 54 
1941 78 66 
1942 ::==::=:=::=--=: 90 83 
1943 
----------------------
111 103 
1944 
--------------_. 
112 93 
1946 
--_ .. --------------
117 107 
1946 --_ ... _------_.- 141 129 
1947 • _________ ._ •• ___ u __ 218 217 
1948 ._ ... _.------_._---_. 118 117 
1949 
------_ ... _._------.-- 125 114 
1950 
------------_._._.---- 166 147 
1951 176 152 
1952 :::::::::::::::::::= 148 142 
1953 
--_._-------------------
146 139 
1954 _____ .u. ___________ ._ 134 138 
1966 
--------_._._-------- 123 134 
1956 .~~--------------.----~ 125 128 
1935 1940 1945 
Fig. 10 December·May simple average, Ohio, Iowa and Nebraska farm pr.cc of corn, annually, 1>;oJ-56. 
OF CORN, 1909-56. L1909 
CENTS PER BUSHE • 
Iowa 
61 
38 
59 
·40 
58 
64 
62 
104 
129 
136 
136 
46 
41 
62 
66 
102 
66 
60 
81 
74 
68 
62 
29 
17 
36 
84 
48 
113 
44 
37 
49 
61 
71 
85 
100 
95 
104 
130 
225 
114 
116 
154 
159 
138 
140 
136 
126 
118 
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•• I, 
1950 
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minus 
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-1 
9 
7 
9 
6 
7 
5 
10 
11 
12 
13 
16 
12 
14 
9 
16 
6 
2 
10 
15 
7 
16 
0 
10 
8 
-4 
1 
-10 
7 
9 
7 
14 
7 
6 
11 
17 
13 
11 
-7 
4 
9 
12 
17 
10 
6 
-1 
-3 
7 
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minus 
Iowa 
-10 
-1 
2 
3 
1\ 
-2 
-7 
-4 
4 
2 
-2 
-8 
-5 
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-7 
-2 
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3 
-2 
3 
-1 
-8 
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-2 
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3 
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11 
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Fig. 11. December-May simple average corn price differentials, Ohio 
minus Iowa, and Nebraska minus Iowa, annually, 1909-56. 
in relative production as open-market prices do. 
Geographical differentials in loan rates of this 
nature have been in effect since 1941. 
EFFECTS OF FLAT AND DIFFEREN'l'IAL LOAN RATES 
We will attempt to measure the effects of the 
flat and differential loan rates on the corn price 
surface over the periods of time when they were 
in effect. 
The variations in the corn price surface could 
be represented by a series of three-dimensional 
models, one model for each point of time. It would 
be difficult, however, for the reader to grasp the 
nature of the variations over a period of years 
from study of photographs of these models. More 
can be learned by selecting a few points repre-
sentative of different parts of the area and show-
ing their prices on two-dimensional time charts. 
This is done in fig. 10 for three points in the 
earn Belt-Nebraska, Iowa and Ohio-rep resent-
.10 
0: 
~ .05 
ing the western, central and eastern parts of the 
Belt. The data for each year are the simple aver-
ages from December to May of the monthly farm 
prices of corn for each state. These data are given 
in table 9. 
Figure 10 shows how the prices of corn in the 
three states changed over the years from 1909 to 
1953, in absolute terms and in relation to each 
other. The figure shows that the prices in the 
three states generally varied in the same direction 
from one year to another, but frequently changed 
relative to each other. 
The nature of these relative changes in prices 
is shown more clearly in fig. 11. In this figure, the 
Iowa price is taken as the base line. The differ-
ences between the Iowa price and the Nebraska 
price are plotted above and below the Iowa price 
in the upper part of the figure; the Ohio prices 
are shown in a similar manner in the lower part of 
the figure. 
Figure 11 is based on annual (December-May) 
data from 1909 to 1955. Figure 12 is based on 
monthly data from 1924 to 1954. 
The space to the left of the two vertical lines 
on these charts represents the open-market period 
before 1933, when the Gee program went into 
effect. The space between the two vertical lines 
represents the 8-year period from 1933 to 1941 
when the loans were made at a flat rate over the 
area (45 cents in 1933, for example). The area 
to the right of the two lines in figs. 11 and 12 
represents the period after 1941 when these geo-
graphical differentials in loan rates were in ef-
fect. 
Did these systems of flat loan rates and differ-
entialloan rates have any effects on the corn price 
surface? (1) Did they flatten out the average 
price surface over a period of years? And (2) did 
they reduce the variability of the price surface 
from year to year? 
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Fig. 12. Corn price differentials, Ohio minus Iowa and Nebraska minus Iowa, monthly, 1924-54. 
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It is natural to turn to figs. 11 and 12 for the 
answer to these two questions. A flattening effect 
would show up in a lowering of the Ohio price 
line, for example, relative to Iowa; and a reduc-
tion in variability would show up in a smoothing 
out of both the Nebraska and Ohio lines, relative 
to Iowa. 
During the flat loan rate period, shown between 
the two vertical lines in figs. 11 and 12, the N e-
braska price line runs higher (relative to Iowa) 
than before or after the period. In contrast, the 
Ohio price line runs lower. It would be easy to con-
clude from this that the flat loan rates had a 
flattening effect on the corn price surface and 
that the differential loan rates restored the sur-
face to about the same unevenness as before the 
program went into effect. 
It would be easy to reach these conclusions, but 
the conclusions would be unreliable. Many things 
were happening during the period from 1933 to 
1941, and the institution of flat loan rates was 
only one of them. It would be fallacious reasoning 
to attribute changes in the corn price surface to 
anyone of these factors without recognition of 
the effects of the others. 
As a matter of fact, the flat loan rates could 
not have had any flattening effect on the corn 
price surface from 1934 to 1937 inclusive, because 
during all of these years the November-May price 
of corn averaged higher than the loan rate as 
shown in table 1, and only insignificant quantities 
of corn were put under loan. 
One of the most important changes that took 
place after World War II was a doubling of the 
price level. Under these conditions, differentials 
after the war would be expected to run only about 
half as great in proportions as in cents. The price 
surface after World War II in cents was about as 
uneven as before the war, but fig. 13 shows that 
in proportional terms, with the differential each 
year divided by the United States average farm 
price of corn that year, the price surface was only 
about half as uneven. That is, it was about half 
flattened out. 
Before we reach another easy conclusion, based 
on study of this figure, that the corn loan pro-
gram half flattened out the corn price surface in 
proportional terms after World War II, we need 
to remember again that many other things were 
happening, as well as the coming of the corn loan 
program. Close inspection of figs. 11, 12 and 13 
shows that the most marked decline in the levels 
of the Nebraska and Ohio price lines took place in 
the early part of the 1933-41 period. The Ohio 
price line in fact is depressed only from 1934 to 
1936. Now 1934 and 1936 were years of extreme 
drouth and short crop in the western part of the 
Corn Belt. This suggests that it was this severe 
decrease in relative corn production in the west-
ern Corn Belt that raised Iowa prices relative to 
Ohio prices during the flat loan rate period, 
rather than the flat loan rate. Perhaps also it was 
this same factor, changes in relative corn produc-
tion in the different states, that affected the level 
of relative corn prices after World War II. 
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Fig. 13. December-May simple average corn price differential divided 
each year by the corresponding United States average farm price of 
corn, Ohio minus Iowa and Nebraska minus Iowa, nnnually, 1909-54. 
As a test of this hypothesis, the annual (Decem-
ber-May) differentials between corn prices in 
different states are plotted against the relative 
corn production in those states (that is, against 
Ohio corn production divided by Iowa corn pro-
duction, and against Nebraska corn production 
divided by Iowa corn production) each year from 
1909 to date in fig. 14. The upper part of the 
chart shows the data for Ohio and Iowa; the 
lower part shows the data for Nebraska and Iowa. 
This chart shows a negative correlation of 
--0.66 for Ohio-Iowa, and -0.69 for Nebraska-
Iowa. A relatively large crop in Ohio or Nebraska 
depresses the price in Ohio or Nebraska relative 
to the price in Iowa. This effect is in line with 
price theory. 
The slopes of the two regression lines for the 
two states fitted mathematically in fig. 14 differ. 
The regression coefficients are --0.54 for Ohio-
Iowa and only -0.25 for Nebraska-Iowa. This 
shows that the relative price responds more than 
twice as much to a given change in relative pro-
duction in Ohio as it does in Nebraska. Nebraska 
is adjacent to Iowa, and shipments of corn from 
one state to the other evidently put a brake on 
the responsiveness of prices to changes in rela-
tive production. 
The dots in fig. 14 do not all lie closely about 
the regression lines. This indicates that factors 
other than relative production also have some 
influence on relative prices. 
The corn loan program does not appear to have 
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Same as upper section, but for. Nebraska and Iowa. 
been one of these other factors. The 7 years when 
substantial quantities of corn were put under loan 
are shown as larger dots in fig. 14. There is no 
evidence that these years lie consistently above, 
or below, or closer to or farther from the lines of 
average relationship than the other dots, taken as 
a group. The regression coefficient for the 7 years 
for Ohio-Iowa is -0.87 and for Nebraska-Iowa is 
-0.19. These coefficients are not significantly 
different from the coefficients for the whole 
period 1909-53 given above, and furthermore, the 
small differences that do exist lie in opposite 
directions. 
The nature of any shifts in the position of the 
regression lines can be revealed to some extent by 
connecting the dots in chronological order. The 
number of dots in the present case is large, and the 
nature of the connecting lines is confused by a 
good deal of overlapping and crossing. A careful 
study of the data, broken down into six time 
periods and plotted separately in different charts 
-too detailed to be shown here-reveals only a 
downward shift in the regression line for Ne-
braska after the severe drouths of 1934-36 re-
duced the number of animal units fed in the state 
by nearly half.1 2 It reveals no stabilizing or other 
effects of the corn loan program on the corn price 
surface. 
Apparently, the corn loan program did not 
appreciably affect the configuration of the corn 
price surface. The price surface continued to vary 
in response to relative changes in corn production 
and in animal units, much the same during the 
flat loan rate period and the differential loan 
rate period as it did before the program was in-
stituted. 
ApPLICATION OF RESULTS 
This leads to a conclusion of considerable prac-
tical importance. 
During the first 8 years of the CCC corn loan 
program, from 1933 to 1940, geographically flat 
loan rates were used. From 1941 on, relatively 
stable geographical loan rate differentials were 
put into effect. Have these relatively stable dif-
ferentials been working out all right, or do they 
need to be replaced by variable differentials, 
varying each year inversely with relative varia-
tions in corn production in different parts of the 
commercial corn area that year? 
The evidence from the present study is that the 
present relatively stable differentials are working 
satisfactorily. They are not imposing any rigidity 
on the flexible corn price surface. The corn price 
surface remains about as responsive to variations 
in relative corn production and numbers of live-
stock fed as before. This implies that, as before, 
corn is as free to move about in response to rela-
tive price changes. There appears to be no need to 
change the existing system of relatively fixed loan 
12/ The details are given in: Measuring and appraising the impact 
of the corn price and acreage control program upon produl!ers, distri-
butors and ConSUmers. NCM-11 Subproject No.3, Corn Progr""s 
Report No.2. Oct. 4, 1955. N-836. 
rate differentials to a system that would vary 
from year to year in response to relative varia-
tions in corn production and numbers of livestock 
fed. . 
EFFECTS OF THE USDA 
ACREAGE CONTROL PROGRAMS 
The USDA acreap;e control programs since 1953 
apparently have had different effects on corn and 
other feed grains acreage and production com-
pared with the effects of earlier programs during 
the 1930's. 
EFFECTS ON CORN AND OTHER 
FEED GRAINS ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION 
Schultz and Brownlee compared the production 
of corn and other feed grains in 1938-40 after the 
AAA corn acreage control program was instituted 
with production in 1928-30 and also with their 
estimates of what production would have been in 
1938-40 without the program. 13 Table 10 is taken 
from their analysis. This table led them to con-
clude that the program had very little effect on 
total corn and other feeds production. 
There were changes within the total, however, 
attributable to the AAA. Schultz and Brownlee 
estimated that under the control program corn 
acreage was reduced about 10 percent below what 
it would have been without a program. However, 
they attributed one-third of the average increase 
in corn yields between 1928-30 and 1938-40 to the 
acreage control program. Therefore, the higher 
estimated acreage without a program was offset 
by estimated lower yields than those that were 
actually attained under the acreage program. 
Thus, the total corn production remained about 
the same with a control program as it would have 
been without a program. They also concluded that 
the acreage control program did promote a some-
13/ T. W. Schultz and O. H. Brownlee. Effects of crop acreage con-
trol features of AAA on feed production in 11 midwest states. Iowa 
Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bu\. 298. April 1952. See also: T. W. Schultz. 
Agriculture in nn unstable economy. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1945. 
p. 172; and G. Shepherd. Agricultural price policy. Iowa State Col· 
lege Press. Ames. Iowa. 1947. "p. 61-64. 
TABLE 10. PRODUCTION OI<' FEED CONCENTRATES IN 11 MID· 
WEST STATES.' 
1928-30 1938·40 1938-40 without crop control 
.... .... ... g §o~ ] § c!' ca ~ 0';-
~=~ ~rt §'= ~r: ~ ~rt §'a t_ ~ ~.~ ~.~ = ~ .... =' =.g= ;;I t~io ; g~3 ~ ,..;::;:1- .]S"'d 1-o::::sQ:S-. ~a~g Q,lc~O >E]] ,;IB .. ~ a~Jl !!; ~e >~I-IO <",",0 0 <: .. ,,~ <: ~-:: " .. ~ <:~- .... 
Corn .... _ ... 62,660 1,826.4 49,962 1,811.2 64.607 1,852.5 
Oats 30,138 501.5 25,073 415.9 26,192 435.6 Barley······· 7.497 141.0 7.170 125.0 7,243 126.6 
Rye _ .... :::: 1,542 18.5 2,225 25.8 2,225 25.8 
Soybeans 712 11.9 3.656 86.8 2,662 63.0 
Total _ .. 102,549 2,499.3 88.086 2.464.7 92,929 2,503.5 
Wheat 27,763 488.6 28,182 476.1 28,764 465.1 
Total :::: 130,312 2,987.9 116,268 2,940.8 121,693 2,968.6 
• The states included are: Iowa t Illinois, Indiana and Ohio; Minne-
sota l Wisconsin and Michigan; and South Dakota, Nebraska. Kansas 
and Missouri. This table was taken from Schultz and Brownlee, op. 
cit., p. 688. 
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what smaller production of corn and oats and a 
larger production of soybeans than would have 
been attained without the program. The change, 
however, was not sufficient to disturb feeding 
operations. 
EFFECTS AFTER WORLD WAR II 
The 1954 and 1955 corn acreage programs ap-
parently had very little effect on total acreage in 
crops. They also had very little effect on corn 
acreage; but they did affect total feed grain pro-
duction. 
Table 11 shows that the total United States 
acreage of corn decreased only 1 percent from 
1953 to 1955. The chief reason why the decrease 
in corn. acreage was so small' was the lack of 
compliance by many corn farmers. Only 42 per-
cent of the Iowa farmers interviewed in a USDA 
study14 complied with corn allotments. Most of 
the corn farmers interviewed who did not comply 
with corn allotments intended to feed their corn 
and therefore were not interested in complying 
for eligibility in' the price support program. Re-
ductions in corn acres made by those who com-
plied with the program were just about offset by 
increases in corn acres made by farmers who did 
not comply. . 
Table 11 also shows that the corn program had 
little or no effect on corn production. But the 
programs for wheat and cotton had substantial 
effects on total feed grains production. 
Compliance in the wheat and cotton programs 
was high. All wheat farmers interviewed by the 
USDA in North Dakota and Washington com-
plied with the allotments. All but 4 percent of the 
wheat farmers interviewed in Kansas and 14 
percent interviewed in Montana complied. Most 
of the acres diverted from wheat, cotton and corn 
went into feed grain production. Iowa corn farm-
ers who complied with corn allotments grew more 
soybeans and oats. Wheat acres were reduced by 
30 percent (see table 11). These acres were main-
ly diverted to grain sorghum in Kansas and to 
barley in other major wheat-producing regions. 
The acres which were taken out of cotton produc-
14/ u. S. Dept. Agt., Agricultural Research Service. Effects of acre· 
age allotment programs. Prod. Res. Rpt. 3. June 1956. See also: 
North Central Farm Management Research Committee. Farmers reo 
action to acreage allotments. Kentucky Agr. Exp. Sta. December 1955. 
TABLE 11. CHANGES IN PRODUCTION, HARVESTED ACREAGE 
AND YIELDS FOR VARIOUS CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
BETWEEN 1953 AND 1955. 
Crop 
Harvested 
acreage 
(percent) 
Wheat .... ____ ._._ .. ____ . _______ - 30 
Cotton ____________ ._.P _______________________ - 31 
Corn _________ . _______________ . _________________ - 1 
~~~ ~~:~_~~~~_~~~:~:::~~:~:~~::~::::::::: + 2~ Barley _____________ ._________________________ + 66 
Grain sorghum _______________________ +105 
Soybeans for beans ___ . __________ + 26 
Flaxseed _________________ ... ______________ + 10 
Rye ___ . _________________ ... ______________________ -+ 49 
All tame hay ...... ______________ .. ______ + 8 
Total 
production (percent) 
- 20 
-11 
no change 
- 17 t 80 61 
+113 
+ 38 
+11 
+ 61 
+ 7 
Yield 
per acre 
(percent) 
t 15 28 
+ 1 
+16 
+25 
-3 
+4 
+9 
t~ 
+3 
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Research Service. Effects of 
acreage allotment programs. U. S. Dept. Agr. Prod. Res. Rpt. 
3. June 1956. p. 6. 
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tion were shifted mainly to the production of soy-
beans, corn, grain sorghum and barley. The di-
version of acres from allotment crops to feed 
grains other than corn resulted in a 10-percent 
increase in the total production of feed grains. 15 
This increase in feed grains production was not 
necessarily a net addition to the total quantity of 
grain fed because some of the wheat would have 
been fed anyway. But the increase had some de-
pressing effect on feed grain prices. 
Thus the wheat and cotton producers trans-
ferred a substantial part of their surplus problem 
to the producers of the nonbasic crops, chiefly the 
feed grains other than corn, for which price sup-
ports were provided without restrictions on pro-
duction. 
"The expansion in production of feed grains 
and the lower prices of these grains tended to en-
courage an expansion in production of grain-con-
suming livestock. However, much of the 6-percent 
increase in this type of livestock that occurred 
between 1953 and 1955 probably would have 
occurred without the allotment programs. There 
was no increase in these years in roughage-con-
suming types of livestock; it would take much 
longer than 2 years for acreage-allotment pro-
grams to bring about a significant increase in 
these types."IG 
EFFECTS ON THE LOCATION OF CORN PRODUCTION 
Some observers believe that the corn program 
increased corn production outside of the CO.rn 
Belt-that is, outside of the original commerCIal 
corn area. 
A recent article on this subject 17 starts out 
"The Corn Belt is not what it used to be." The 
article included a chart, similar to fig. 15, entitled 
"Big Increase in U. S. Corn Growing Area~," 
showing the increase in the number of countIes 
attaining the s tat u s of "commercial corn 
counties"18 in recent years. Most of these new 
commercial corn counties are located on the fringe 
of the Corn Belt and in scattered areas in the 
South. The chart appears to show that corn pro-
duction is being expanded outside the Corn Belt. 
It is true that the number of commercIal corn 
counties has increased more than 50 percent. 
When the commercial area was first set up in 
1938 it was composed of 566 counties. The only 
counties outside the Midwest were four Missis-
sippi and Ohio riverbottom counties of Kentucky. 
By 1950, the area had expand.ed to 837 counties, 
including 55 in Kentucky, 12 III Tennessee and 5 
in Arkansas. 
Further increases in the production of corn led 
to enlargement of the area to 932 counties for 
1958. There are 17 new corn counties in Alabama, 
15/ u. S. Dept. Agt., Agricultural Research Service, op. cit., pp. 1 
and 2. 
16/ u. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural Research Service. op. cit., p. 2. 
17/ Des Moines Sunday Register. Nov. 10, 1957. p. 21·G. 
18/ Commercial corn counties are defined by law as those wbose farms 
produced an average of 450 bushels of corn per farm or 4 bushels Or 
more per acre of farmland in the county. 
l1li 1931 AREA 
_ AREA ADDED 1931 TO 1951 
Fig. 15. Original 1938 commercial corn area and eounti... added since 1938. 
5 in Florida, 28 in Georgia, 32 in North Carolina, 
2 in South Carolina, 25 in Tennessee and· 17 in 
the Virginias. The East, too, has greater repre-
sentation, including 11 counties in New Jersey, 
31 in Pennsylvania and 16 in Maryland. 
Does this increase in the size of the commercial 
corn area mean that corn production is being 
driven out of the Corn Belt? 
Many observers believe that it does. They be-
lieve that acreage controls on corn, the denying 
of corn loans to noncom pliers, and the substitution 
of corn for controlled crops like wheat and cotton 
in other areas are driving corn production out of 
the traditional Corn Belt area. 
What do the corn acreage and production data 
show? Analysis of the corn acreage and produc-
tion data, however, shows that this is not true. 
The data, compiled by the Grain Division of the 
Commodity Stabilization Service, USDA, are giv-
en by years since 1948 in tables 12 and 13. They 
are shown graphically in figs. 16 and 17. 
The data show the corn acreage and production 
in the 1958 commercial corn area and outside the 
commercial corn area (that is, in the noncom-
mercial corn area) each year since 1948. The data 
are shown as percentages of the 1948-50 average. 
The table and chart show that the acreage of 
corn in the commercial corn area has declined 8.5 
percent in recent years below the 1948-50 level, 
but that the acreage of corn outside the area has 
declined further, 23.5 percent below the 1948-50 
level. 
The table and chart show also that corn produc-
tion in the commercial corn area has risen 5 per-
cent since 1948-50, but that outside the area, it has 
declined 7 percent. 
Thus, corn acreage and production is not being 
driven out of the commercial corn area. On the 
contrary, it is moving into the commercial corn 
-area. 
Analysis by states. Another analysis, made by 
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TABLE 12. ALL CORN ACREAGE, 1958 COMMERCIAL CORN AREA AND NONCOMMERCIAL CORN AREA, 1948-57 (PLANTED ACRES 
-THOUSANDS). 
a-year 
average 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
1948-50 
Commercial area .. __ 59,242 59,859 61,446 56,422 59,043 59,094 GO,319 60,194 60,030 57,435 54,237 
Percent each annual 
acreage is of 1948-50 average ____________ ._ . _________ 101.0 103.7 95.2 99.7 99.8 101.8 101.6 101.3 96.9 91.6 
Noncommercial area 25,797 25,663 25,292 26,437 24,232 23,136 21,255 21,991 21,067 20,784 19,748 
Percent each annual 
a-creage is of 1948-50 average ___ ~ ________ . ___________ 99.5 98.0 102.5 93.9 89.7 82.4 85.2 81.7 80.6 76.6 
Sow'ce: U. S. Dept. Agr., Grain Division, Commodity Stabilization Service. April 18, 1958. 
TABLE 13. ALL CORN PRODUCTION, 1958 COMMERCIAL CORN AREA AND NONCOMMERCIAL CORN AREA, 1948-57 (MILLION 
BUSHELS). 
3-year 
average 
1948-50 
Commercial area __ 2,662 
Percent each annual 
production is of 1948-50 average ___________ _ 
Noncommercial area _ 644 
Percent each annual 
production is of 
1948-50 average ___________ . __ 
1948 
2,963 
111.3 
642 
99.7 
1949 
2,617 
98.3 
621 
96.4 
1950 
2,405 
90.3 
670 
104.0 
1951 
2,349 
88.2 
577 
89.6 
SOIll'ce: U. S. Dept. Agr., Grain Division, Commodity Stabilization Service. 
the present authors, uses an earlier base period 
(1940-49) and shows more details by states. 
The 10 years 1940-49 were chosen as the basis 
for comparison because the severe drouths of 
1934 and 1936 affected corn production in the 
western part of the Corn Belt during 1934 and 
1936 and affected corn acreage for several years 
afterwards. Comparisons based on more recent 
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1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
2,815 2,699 2,614 2,608 2,850 2,804 
105.7 101.4 98.2 98.0 107.1 105.3 
477 511 444 622 605 599 
74.1 79.3 68.9 96.6 93.9 93.0 
April 18, 1958. 
years, for example 1944-53, show similar results, 
but less marked because of the shorter lapse of 
time. 
The data used in this analysis are shown in 
tables 14 and 15. They are shown graphically in 
figs, 18 and 19. 
These tables and charts show corn acreage and 
production in the four states which lie in the 
heart of the Corn Belt-Iowa, Illinois, Indiana and 
Ohio (these are the only states which lie wholly 
in the commercial corn area). The tables show 
also the corn acreage and corn production figures 
TABLE 14. CORN: ANNUAL INDEXES OF ACREAGE HAR-
VESTED, 1951-57, AND AVERAGE 1950-57 (BASE 1940-49=100).* 
1940-49 1950-57 
average 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 average 
Seven 
southern 
states ....... - 100 91.8 87.4 86.4 81.3 82.2 79.1 76.4 71.7 82.0 
Four 
Corn Belt 
states _. ____ 100 96.6 103,0 104.5 107.6 106.8 107.1 101.4 98.2 103.0 
Remainder of 
United 
States ________ 100 91.5 88.1 87.1 86.0 85.8 84.7 80.4 77.3 85.1 
Total for 
United 
States _. ______ 100 93.1 92.5 93.2 91.7 91.2 90.5 86.1 82.7 90.0 
• / This table was compiled by R. D. Krenz. 
TABLE 16. CORN: ANNUAL INDEXES m' PRODUCTION, 1951-
67, AND AVERAGE 1950-57 (BASE 1940-49=100).* 
1940-49 1950-57 
average 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 average 
Seven 
southern 
states ________ 100 112.9 103.9 75.1 98.1 71.3 118.5 114.6 102.7 99.9 
Four 
Corn Belt 
states .... _c. 100 95.6 102.2 119.9 114.1 113.9 114.0 121.6 118.1 112.4 
Remainder of 
United 
States ________ 100 107.2 93.7 108.5 102.2 98.3 100.0 110.4 113.0 104.2 
Total for 
United 
Stlltes ________ 100 102.6 98.7 110.0 107.1 102.6 108.4 115.9 114.2 107.4 
"/ This table was compiled by R. D. Krenz. 
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Fig. 18. Annual indexes of corn acreage harvested, 1951-57 and aver-
age 1950-57 (base 1940-49=100). 
for the seven southeastern states (Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North 
Carolina and South Carolina) and for the rest of 
the states (37 states). Figures for the United 
States as a whole also are shown. 
Table 14 shows that by 1957, corn acreage in 
the United States as a whole decreased 17.3 per-
cent below its level in 1940-49. In the four central 
Corn Belt states, however, corn acreage decreased 
only 1.8 percent, whereas in the seven southeast-
ern states it decreased 28.3 percent. In the rest of 
the states (the 37 states outside of the four Corn 
Belt states and seven southern states) corn acre-
age decreased 22.7 percent. The situation is shown 
graphically in fig. 18. 
Thus corn acreage is becoming relatively more 
concentrated in the heart of the Corn Belt, not 
less. 
The same sort of relative concentration of corn 
acreage in the Corn Belt is shown by the 1950-57 
average acreage data shown in the last column 
of table 14. In this case, corn acreage in the four 
Corn Belt states is up 3 percent, whereas it is 
down substantially in the rest of the country. 
Corn production varies considerably from year 
to year, due chiefly to changes in the weather, 
but in most years it also is increasing more in the 
four Corn Belt states than in the southern states 
or the rest of the country. Table 15 shows that the 
corn production percentages for the four Corn 
Belt states exceeded the percentages for all the 
other areas in 1957 and in most of the earlier 
years. The percentages for the seven southern 
states rose slightly above the percentages for the 
four Corn Belt states and for the other areas too 
in 1955, but ended up well below the percentages 
for all the other areas in the most recent year, 
1957 (see fig. 19). 
The same sort of situation is shown by the 
average data for 1950-57. Total corn production 
for the United States was up 9.4 percent. For the 
four Corn Belt states it was up 12.4 percent, 
while in the seven southern states, it was actually 
down a trifle. In the rest of the country it was up 
only 4.2 percent. 
In only one respect are the seven southern 
states advancing more rapidly than the four Corn 
Belt states; that is in relative yield per acre, in 
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percentage terms (but not in absolute terms). 
This increase in yield per acre may be one of the 
main reasons why the number of commercial corn 
c~unties has been increasing creating the impres-
sIon that corn production has been increasing. 
These data show the combined influence of all 
the factors that have been affecting the location 
of corn acreage and production-changes in tech-
nology, changes in population, etc.--as well as the 
corn programs. The direct effect of the. corn pro-
grams alone may have reinforced the influence 
of these other factors, or it may have completely 
or partially offset them. The data do not meas-
ure the effect of the corn programs alone. The 
corn programs may have had a decentralizing-
or centralizing-influence on the location of corn 
acreage and production. All that the data show is 
that as a result of all the influences acting upon 
them, corn acreage and production are in fact 
becoming somewhat more centralized in the heart 
of the Corn Belt, not less centralized. 
EFFECTS OF THE CORN PROGRAM ON 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
The corn storage program was originally set 
up in the belief that stabilizing the flow of corn 
into consumption would stabilize corn prices and 
that this would stabilize livestock production and 
prices, too. 
Has this belief been confirmed? Has the corn 
and other feed grain storage program stabilized 
livestock production and prices? 
A Senate Document prepared by the USDA in 
1952 used .statistical measures which "suggest 
that the prIce support and storage programs in 
force during the past 12 to 15 years may have 
reduced the earlier variability of corn consump-
tio~ by livestock by as much as 50 percent." 111 
ThIS could be expected to reduce the variations 
in livestock production. 
Elmer Working, however, in the study referred 
19/ Reserve levels for storable farm products. Senate Document No 
130. U. S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D. C., 1952. p. 41. • 
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to earlier, compared the average coefficients of 
variation of hog slaughter and of cattle slaughter 
for the two periods 1909-33 and 1937-52, which 
he l' e fer l' e d to as the pre-loan and post-loan 
periods. He found that the coefficient increased 
from 8.0 percent to 14.9 percent for hogs, and 
from 4.1 percent to 6.3 percent for cattle. He 
therefore concluded: "These comparisons, then, 
do not lend support to the idea that reducing corn 
price fluctuations will necessarily help stabilize 
livestock production. Rathel', they suggest that 
the reduction of corn price fluctuations which we 
have had under the corn loan and wartime price 
control programs may have increased the fluctua-
tions in livestock production."20 
Which of these apparently conflicting conclu-
sions is correct? 
In answering this question, the first thing is 
to recognize that the corn loan program was only 
a small factor after 1933 compared with the other 
events that took place: the most severe drouths in 
history, which reduced corn production 40 per-
cent in those years; all~out production of hogs as 
a war measure in 1943; price ceilings and ration-
ing during World War II; a doubling of the price 
level after the war; a drop in total feed concen-
trate production of 25 percent from 1946 to 1947 
and a rise of 40 percent from 1947 to 1948; and 
war in Korea in 1950. 
Any single mathematical figure for each period 
(before and after the corn program was started 
in 1933) such as the USDA and Working used, 
reflects the influence of all these other factors as 
well as of the corn program. It does not measure 
the influence of the corn program alone. Here, as 
with the study of the effect of the corn program 
on corn prices, it is necessary to compare the 
variations in livestock production after the pro-
grams were begun, not with the variation before 
the programs but with what the variation would 
have been if the programs had not been instituted. 
If this can be done, it will provide a basis for 
determining whether the corn program had a 
stabilizing effect on corn consumption by live-
stock (and thus presumably on livestock produc-
tion) as the Senate Doc u men t suggests, or 
whether it unstabilized livestock production, as 
Working's study suggests. Several more years of 
data are available now than in 1952 and 1953 
when these other studies were published. We can 
see how the conclusions have stood the test of 
time. 
EFFECTS ON CORN CONSUMPTION 
To stabilize corn consumption, the cee would 
need to withhold stocks when corn crops were 
large and return them to the market when crops 
were small. The correlation between corn produc-
tion and the change in eee stocks at the end of 
the crop year would be positive. 
The data to show what the nature of the corre-
lation actually is are given in table 1.~. The table 
201 E. J. Working, op. cit., p. 790. 
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TABLE 16. CORN PRODUCTION AND CORN UNDER LOAN OR 
OWNED BY CCC AT THE END OF THE CROP YEAR, 1933·56. 
Year Corn production for all purposes 
(1,000 bu.) 
1933 ________ . ____ . ____ 2,397,593 
1934 ___________ . ______ 1,448,920 
1935 ___________ . ____ 2,299,363 
1936 __________________ 1,505,689 
1937 ______ . __________ 2,642,978 
1938 _________________ 2,548,753 
1939 _________________ 2,580,985 
1940 _. _________ . ____ 2,457,146 
1941 ____ . __ . ________ 2,651,889 
1942 _____ . __________ 3,068,562 
1943 _______ . __________ 2,965,980 
1944 ___________ . ___ 3.087,982 
1945 _________________ 2,868,495 
1946 ________________ 3,217,076 
1947 __________________ 2,354,739 
1948 _. _____ . ________ 3,605,078 
1949 _______ . _______ ... 3,237,749 
1950 _______ . ___ . ____ 3,074,914 
1951 ________ . ________ 2,925,758 
1952 __________________ 3,291,994 
1953 __________________ 3,209,896 
1954 __________ . ______ 3,057,891 
1955 ________________ ._ 3,229,743 
1956 _. _____ ... ________ 3,451,292 
CCC corn stocks Change in 
at end of COrn stocks from 
crop year previous year 
(million bu.) 
82 
45 
258 
471 
403 
197 
8 
6 
9 
9 
493 
£50 
488 
306 
580 
736 
870 
1,060 
1,295 
+ 82 
- 82 
o 
o 
+ 45 
+213 
+213 
- 68 
-206 
-189 
2 
+ 3 
- 9 
+ 9 
- 9 
+484 
+157 
-162 
-182 
+274 
+156 
+IM 
+190 
+235 
shows corn production each year since 1933 when 
the corn loan program began and the quantities 
of corn under loan or owned by the eee at the 
end of the crop year. 
The table shows that the corn program had 
very little effect during the early 1930's. The 
eee was just getting started in 1933. It carried 
over only 82 million bushels at the end of the 
1933 season, and most of that amount was in 
process of being redeemed. The eee therefore 
was not able to fill out the short crops of the next 
few years to any significant extent. 
From 1937 to 1939, the eee stocks were built 
up from the moderately large crops of those 3 
years to nearly half a billion bushels. Then came 
World War II in 1941. In 1942 and 1943, the eee 
stocks were used, not to fill in short crops, but to 
add to large crops. Along with the feeding of 
large quantities of normally nonfeed grains, the 
stocks helped to produce a tremendous expansion 
in hog production in 1942 and 1943, far in excess 
of anything before or since. 
This expansion in hog production is the chief 
reason why the "post-loan" (post 1933) variation 
in hog slaughter is greater than the "pre-loan" 
(pre 1933) variation. It cannot properly be re-
garded as an unstabilizing effect of the corn loan 
and other programs, in the sense in which the 
term unstabilizing is generally used in peacetime. 
as an undesirable thing. Rather it was a planned 
expansion, desired and necessary to the war ef-
fort, not an unintended and undesired result of 
the corn stabilization program. 
For these reasons, conclusions concerning the 
effects of the corn loan program need to be based 
chiefly on the period, not since 1933 but since 
World War II, when the demand for meat was 
relatively stable and stability in livestock produc-
tion was desired. 
Post-war period. Study of the period since the 
war gives some support to the USDA conclusion 
that the corn stabilization program had a stabi-
lizing effect on corn consumption. 
The eee stocks were too small in 1946 to have 
much effect in filling out the short corn crop of 
1947; but the eee reduced the impact of the large 
crop of corn in 1948 by absorbing nearly half a 
billion bushels of corn at the end of the 1948 crop 
year-a record up to that time. 
Stocks were built up further from the average 
size crop of 1950 and then drawn down to increase 
supplies from the short crop of 1951. During the 
next several years, nearly all of the crops were 
above average size, and stocks increased to record 
heights. 
Figure 20 shows the corn production and stocks 
data in graphic form, the one series plotted 
against the other. The figure shows that the cor-
relation between size of crop and change in eee 
stocks at the end of the crop marketing year is 
positive. Furthermore, if 1946 and 1947 are ig-
nored, because stocks in those years were still 
low because of the war effort, the slope of the 
line of relationship (the regression line) is about 
4 to 5. That is, on the average the eee corn loan 
program removed about 80 percent of the excess 
over average corn production in large crop years 
and returned it in small crop years. Thus, on the 
average the eee corn loan program had a sub-
stantial stabilizing effect on corn consumption. 
The scatter about the line of relationship be-
tween corn production and eee stocks is fairly 
wide. That is, the correlation is not high. This 
means that the eee program did not do a very 
accurate job of stabilization, year by year. Some 
years, it withheld more than the excess over aver-
age production; other years, it withheld less. 
With this qualification, the over-all conclusion 
can be reached that after 1947, when the effects 
of the war-time programs had subsided, the eee 
corn loan program had a considerable stabilizing 
effect on corn consumption. 
The stabilizing effect of the corn program on 
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Fig. 20. Year-ta-year change in corn under loan or owned by CCC 
Sept. 30 plotted against U. S. corn production. 
corn consumption presumably had a stabilizing 
effect on livestock production. The same kind of 
conclusion could also be presumed with respect to 
total feed grains, if the feed grains programs as 
a group had a stabilizing effect on total feed 
grains consumption. Let us see what the facts of 
the matter are. 
EFFECTS ON LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
Hogs. The bulk of the hogs in the United 
States are produced in the Corn Belt, on corn-
producing farms, and corn constitutes about 80 
percent of their feed. 21 The relation between 
corn supplies and hog production, therefore, could 
be expected to be close, and a corn storage pro-
gram that smoothed out the variations in corn 
supplies could be expected to smooth out the varia-
tions in hog production, too. 
Table 17 and fig. 21 shows pork production 
annually since 1926.:!:! The chart shows clearly 
that the variation in pork production increased 
substantially after 1933 when the corn program 
began. On the face of it, this could be regarded 
as evidence that the corn program unstabilized 
pork production rather than stabilized it. 
211 R. D. Jennings. Consumption of feed by livestock. 1909-47. U. S. 
Dept. Agr. Oire. 836. December 1949. p. 87. 
221 Pork production is used bere rather than hog slaughter. because it 
shows the total weight "roduced. whereas hog slaughter shows only the 
total number of hogs, ignoring changes in their weighta. 
TABLE 17. HOG SLAUGHTER, PORK PRODUCTION. CORN 
PRODUCTION. CORN FED AND TOTAL CONCENTRATES FED, 
1926-56. 
III ~ • " to III ~ • ~.= "" ~..!t~ c!,c o~<> ~.!tg 
.::::...a= ..... C? "' ..... <>"" 
" .. ~:..Ji -t'7 .!d.g.e - ~ .$l c...;"'; "; u . ...s 
" 
.5;= ~e~1: ~ bt :s~~ ~S::~1:l. .. ~~8Jj ~";l~ o ~.g oou~ >< !l. ~.!..!l 0000 E-<"Otll 
(thous.) (thous.) (mil. lb.) (tn:!. (mil. (mil. tons) tons) tons) 
1926 .... 41,150 62,585 7,966 71.3 67.2 103.4 
1927 .... 43.090 66,195 8,430 73.3 70.4 107.7 
1928 .... 47.370 72,889 9,041 74.6 66.0 107.2 
1929 .... 48,951 71,012 8,833 70.6 64.8 104.9 
1930 .... 45,542 67,272 8,482 58.2 52.5 95.6 
1931 .... 43,569 69,233 8,739 72.1 64.3 103.7 
1932 .... 46,666 71.425 8,923 82.0 73.5 111.1 
1933 .... 47,104 73.270 9,234 67.1 63.1 91.9 
1934 .... 43.910 68,760 8,397 40.6 44.1 71.4 
1935 .... 30.680 46.011 5.919 64.4 55.7 94.1 
1936 .... 31,022 58.730 7,474 42.2 42.5 75.5 
1937 __ 34.144 63,715 6.951 74.0 56.5 97.0 
1938 .. _ 34.580 58,927 7.680 71.4 58.8 99.0 
1939 .... 39,719 66.561 8.660 72.3 62.5 102.2 
1940 _ .. 47,650 77,610 10,044 68.8 63.2 108.0 
1941 .... 48.000 71,397 9.628 74.3 70.0 118.7 
1942 .... 52.363 78,547 10.876 85.9 81.5 142.1 
1943 .... 59,981 95,226 13,640 83.0 80.2 139.0 
1944 .... 73,842 98.068 18,304 86.6 76.1 128.9 
1946 _ 43.887 71.891 10,697 80.3 76.9 132.6 
1946 .... 42.929 76,116 11,150 80.1 74.8 122.7 
1947 .... 47,062 74,001 10,502 65.9 63.4 110.6 
1948 .... 47,736 71.869 10,055 100.9 71.5 120.1 
1949 .... 51.205 75,997 10,286 90.7 79.4 126.4 
1950 ._. 56.379 79,263 10,714 86.1 78.1 130.3 
1961 .... 60,984 85.560 11,481 81.9 79.7 132.3 
1952 .... 63,029 86,572 11,627 92.2 73.4 122.1 
1953 _._ 56,600 74,368 10,006 89.9 76.0 126.0 
1954 .... 61,483 71,495 9,870 85.6 72.6 126.1 
1955 .... 58.182 81,058 10.991 90.4 76.4 131.5 
1956 .... 67.469 85.216 11,221 96.6t 79.2t lS3.0t 
* 1 F. I. hog slaughter. Oct. I-Se"t. 30. 1956, for example. means Oet. 
1955-Sept. 1956. 
tl Preliminary. 
Soltrce: Hog and pork data: U. S. De"t. Agr., Agricultural Marketing 
Service. Livestoek market news statistics and related data. 
1956. pp. 25, 67. Feed data: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agricultural 
Marketing Service. Grain and feerl statistics through 1956. P". 
2-3; and Feed situation. Oct. 1957. P. 6.-
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against COrn fed, 1926-56. 
Study of fig. 21, however, suggests that the 
increase in the variation in pork production after 
1933 resulted chiefly from two unique events, 
both unrelated to the corn program. The sharp 
decline in pork production during the 1930's came 
immediately after the severe drouths of 1934 and 
1936; the great peak in 1942 and 1943 came as a 
result of the war effort to produce the maximum 
amount of meat by full utilization of the large 
crops produced in those years plus most of the 
large supplies of corn carried over from the im· 
mediate pre·war years. This indicates that varia· 
tions in corn supplies have a controlling influence 
on pork production. 
The nature of the relationship is shown in the 
next few figures. Figure 22 shows that the rela· 
tion between corn production and hog production, 
as measured by the number of hogs slaughtered 
under federal inspection October to September, 
is not very close. One reason for that is that pri· 
vate and public storage operations usually smooth 
out the effects of variations in corn production 
to some extent, so that the market supplies of 
corn vary less than corn production varies. Fig. 
ure 23 shows that the relation between corn 
consumption by livestock (corn fed October to 
September) and federally inspected hog slaughter 
is closer than the relation between corn produc-
tion and federally inspected hog slaughter. 
Federally inspected slaughter is only a part of 
total hog slaughter; it is a major part, averag-ing 
about two-thirds, but the proportion varies from 
year to year. Estimates of the total number of 
hogs slaughtered are available, although only on 
a calendar year (January to December) basis. 
When these total hog slaughter data for the calen-
dar year are plotted against corn fed from Oc-
tober of the preceding year to September of the 
given year, as in fig. 24, the relation is still closer 
than in the preceding figures. 
The hog slaughter data, however, show only the 
number of hogs, ignoring variations in their 
weights. If the data showing total pork produc-
tion (excluding lard) in pounds are p lot ted 
against corn fed, the relation between the two 
series is still closer than in fig. 24; the coefficient 
of correlation is 0.87. If the pork production data 
are plotted against total concentrates fed (corn, 
oats, barley and sorghum grains, wheat and rye. 
oilseed cake and meal, animal protein feeds and 
other by-product feeds) as in fig. 25, the relation 
is closer yet; the coefficient is 0.94. 
These high correlations provide some basis for 
the expectation that the CCC corn loan program 
would stabilize corn production to about the same 
extent that it stabilizes corn and total concentrates 
consumption. 
Examination of the period 1948-56, however, 
when corn crops and CCC storage stocks were 
large and the program should have been most 
effective, shows that the correlations between 
corn and other feed supplies and pork production 
were lower than for the period as a whole. For 
the period 1948-56 alone, the correlation with corn 
fed was only 0.55; the correlation with total con-
centrates fed was 0.80. This was partly due to 
the small range of variation in supplies d'~ring 
those years, and partly due to the fact that hog 
production responds to other things as well as to 
feed supplies. Apparently, during this period, the 
CCC corn loan program could have had only a 
partial stabilizing effect on pork production. 
Beef cattle. Figure 26 shows that the number 
of cattle on farms varies in cycles, with an aver-
age length of about 15 years. These cyclic varia-
tions are particularly marked in the case of beef 
cattle, as shown by the data since 1920. 
The annual production of cattle, as measured 
by the number of calves born, is shown in fig. 27. 
This figure shows that the number of calves born 
annually is more stable than the inventory of total 
cattle numbers shown in fig. 26. Beef production, 
as measured by the quantity of beef consumed, 
is shown in fig. 28. 
It is difficult to find much evidence of the in-
fluence of variations in corn and other feed grains 
production in anyone of these three charts. Corn 
and other feed grains constitute less than a third 
of the total feed used in beef cattle production ;23 
23/ R. D. Jennings. Animal units of livestock fed annually. 1909 to 
1956. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 215. July 1957. p. 7. 
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roughage (hay, pasture and other forage) is the 
big input. Grain consumption by beef cattle is 
only from one-fifth to one-third as large as grain 
. consumption by hogs.24 Other factors, such as 
weather which affects roughage production in the 
range country and in other areas, may be as im-
portant as grain. Still other factors are the cyclic 
changes in beef cattle on farms, changes in the 
rate of slaughter of the stock and steers, changes 
in the per capita demand for beef, etc. 
When so many factors are at work, it is diffi-
cult to isolate the effect of corn and other feed 
grains alone. The beef consumption chart shows 
a small rise in 1934, reflecting some liquidation 
of beef herds in response to the very small corn 
crop and the beef buying program in 1934, and a 
small decline the next year_ The same sort of thing 
happened again in 1936, when the corn crop was 
again very small. There was a small rise in beef 
consumption again in 1945, when the corn crop 
was about 5 percent below previous levels, and 
another in 1947, when the corn crop was about 
25 percent short. But the throwing off of OP A 
ceilings and other restrictions when World War 
II ended may have been the chief reason for these 
changes in beef consumption; it may have had 
more effect than the changes in corn production. 
About the only other big change in beef con-
sumption was the sharp rise that took place from 
1951 to 1953, which was then extended in the 
form of a more gradual but steady rise after that 
time. It is difficult to see any close connection 
between these recent increases in beef production 
and the size of the corn crop and other feed crops; 
these crops, in the years after 1951, were only a 
little larger than the crops in the preceding sev-
eral years. 
Evidently, variations in the size of the corn 
and other feeds crops are only one of the several 
factors that affect beef production and consump-
tion. It is difficult, therefore, to measure the in-
fluence of the corn and feed grain stabilization 
programs which were designed to smooth out 
these variations. 
Beef production is plotted against corn fed to 
livestock and against total concentrates fed, in 
figs. 29 and 30, in the same way that pork pro-
duction is plotted against these factors in figs. 
24 and 25. The correlations are positive, but they 
are low, and most of the relationship that does 
exist results from the long-run upward trend in 
both series rather than from irregular variations 
from year to year. Apparently, the corn program 
could have had only a much smaller stabilizing 
effect on beef production than it had on hog 
production. 
PROSPECTIVE EFFECTS ON LIVESTOCK 
IN THE FUTURE 
The prospective effects of the corn and other 
programs on livestock production and prices in 
Fig, 28. Meat production, 1930-57. 24/ Pbotostat of .table from R. D. Jennings. 
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Fig. 29. United States beef production next calendar year plotted 
against corn fed, October-September. 
the future are of course even more difficult to 
estimate than the effects in the past. And one or 
two new factors are looming up which may have 
quite disturbing effects. 
One new factor is the very large size of the 
stocks of corn and other feed grains which have 
accumulated in eee hands. This factor is com-
plicated by another-the evident ability of pro-
grams for other crops to shift a substantial part 
of their surplus problems to the nonbasic feed 
crops. This poses a real threat to the corn stabili-
zation program in the next few years. 
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Fig. 30. United States beef production next calendar year plotted 
against total concentrates fed. October-September. 
It poses a real threat to the livestock industry 
too. If the size of the stocks of feed grains becomes 
virtually unmanageable, the manner in which 
stocks are disposed of could seriously disturb the 
livestock industry. 
This problem involves the whole agricultural 
program, for other crops as well as for feed 
grains, and it calls for consideration of that whole 
program from the point of view of its impact on 
the livestock industry. 
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